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THE CHINESE VIEW OF IMMORTALITY: ITS EXPRESSION BY CHU HSI AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO BUDDHIST THOUGHT*

By Derk Bodde

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In the long history of Chinese thought, one of its greatest figures has been the Neo-Confucianist, Chu Hsi (A.D. 1130-1200). For several centuries before his time most of the best minds of China had devoted themselves to Buddhism, while Confucianism, though accepted as a basis for political institutions, had shown little ideological development. Beginning about A.D. 1000, however, a strong revival of Confucianism took place, fostered by a brilliant group of men who showed themselves usually antagonistic to Buddhism, even though, at the same time, they were indebted to it for many of their own concepts. Chu Hsi was easily the most important of this group, and it is chiefly owing to his genius that the scattered ideas of his predecessors were welded into a coherent, all-inclusive system of thought, which speedily became accepted as the basis of Chinese orthodoxy. The Neo-Confucianism of Chu Hsi, therefore, has for somewhat more than seven hundred years, until the last four or five decades, exerted an incalculable influence upon the minds of the vast majority of well educated Chinese.

There has recently appeared elsewhere a fairly lengthy account of Chu Hsi's philosophy, translated by myself from a history of Chinese philosophy written by Fung Yu-lan, a well known contemporary Chinese historian of philosophy.[1] In the seventh section of that account, Professor Fung presents an exposition of Chu Hsi's criticisms on Buddhism. The present article is an attempt on my part to expand certain of the ideas there presented in passing, and to relate them to the general stream of Chinese thought.

Before doing this, however, it is necessary, for the sake of intelligibility, to sketch very briefly one or two of Chu Hsi's main concepts. According to Chi Hsi, the universe is a dual one. On the

* I am indebted to Dr. W. Norman Brown, Professor of Sanskrit at the University of Pennsylvania, for having read this article and checked upon its use of Sanskrit terms.

1. Fung Yu-lan, "The Philosophy of Chu Hsi," translated with introduction and notes by Derk Bodde, *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, VII (1942), 1-51.

one hand, there exists a physical world of concrete matter; on the other, a metaphysical world made up of abstract *li* (translated by me as Law). This *li* or Law is multiple, so that for every single class of objects that belong to the physical world of matter, there exists a corresponding Law or principle in the metaphysical world, which is described by Chu Hsi as being "above form." These innumerable Laws, however, are not only transcendent; at the same time they directly manifest themselves within the individual things (both man-made and natural) of our phenomenal world. It is they, indeed, that give order and form to the world of matter. Without them there could exist no separate physical objects having specific characteristics and functions; there would, in fact, be only a mass of undifferentiated and inchoate ether. To give an example: it is the metaphysical Law that pertains to boats that causes such boats (as found in our physical world) to move only on water and not on land, just as it is the Law pertaining to carts that causes carts to move only on land.

When found immanent in this way in material things, these Laws or *li* are known as *hsing*. This word has a long history in Chinese philosophy, in which it usually means human nature. In Chu Hsi's system, however, it is evident that not only men, but also animals and even inanimate things, have their own *hsing* or individualized Law, since all things possess Law. The term, therefore, is translated by me simply as the Nature (that pertains to any specified object). In human beings this Nature manifests itself via the Mind (*hsin*), which is conceived by Chu Hsi as belonging wholly to the physical world of matter, but as, at the same time, acting as a temporal container or lodging-place for the metaphysical and universal Law.

With the above by way of introduction, we may now turn to consider some of the reasons for Chu Hsi's criticism of Buddhism. One of his leading points of attack, as outlined by Professor Fung in section 7 of his article, is the accusation that the Buddhists fail to understand the true character of the Nature (*hsing*), and confuse it with Mind. Chu Hsi quotes with approval (cf. Fung, *op. cit.*, p. 49) the saying: "What the Buddhists call the Nature is exactly what the (Confucian) Sage calls Mind, and what the Buddhists call Mind is exactly what the Sage calls Thought." On the surface, this may seem like a mere quibbling over terms; actually it represents a basic difference between Neo-Confucianism and Buddhism, or, at least, between

Neo-Confucianism and what Chu Hsi seemed to regard as Buddhism.

For Law, according to Chu Hsi, pertains to the permanent and unchanging metaphysical world that is "above form," and hence is itself necessarily universal and impartial. Its manifestation (under the name of *hsing* or Nature) within any given object of our physical universe, therefore, is a purely temporary phenomenon, which is ever taking place within an infinite number of separate objects simultaneously. Thus the Law that pertains to human beings, for example, manifests itself simultaneously within all existent human beings alike, and endures permanently quite regardless of the life or death of any particular one of these human beings. In other words, the fact that any physical thing (such as a human being, in the example just given) is a temporary sharer of the Law pertaining to that class of things, in no way gives to the particular thing in question a personal entity of its own that will endure after the physical disintegration of that thing.

In the case of Mind, however, quite a different situation prevails. Mind is something concrete and physical, which belongs to the transitory world of matter that is "below form." It is individual and unique, therefore, for every separate being that possesses it. For the very same reason, however, it, like the beings that possess it, is equally subject to change and dissolution, so that its existence within any given individual being cannot give to that individual a permanent entity of its own.

With these points clearly understood, it is easy to see why Chu Hsi objected to what he considered the confusion made by the Buddhists between the Nature and the Mind. For to designate as the Nature something that really has the characteristics of the Mind, is to attribute to what is permanent and universal (Law, which comprises the Nature) the quality of individuality that properly pertains only to Mind. In other words, it is to ascribe to individual objects an entity which is falsely called the Nature, and which is erroneously regarded both as permanent, and yet at the same time (unlike the true Nature) as being separate for each object.

The same point of view underlies Chu Hsi's statement (cf. Fung, p. 48) that "the Confucianists maintain that Law (*li*) undergoes neither creation nor destruction. The Buddhists maintain that there is a Spiritual Intelligence (*shên shih*) that undergoes neither creation nor destruction." In the note on this latter term in my translation of

Fung's article, I have explained that it is a Buddhist name for the soul. It is used, for example, in one Buddhist text as follows: "At the time of the end of the world, fierce flames will appear filling the entire universe. The souls (*shên shih*) of the dead will then crash down from their flight and be carried on the smoke to enter a boundless hell." It is evident, therefore, that Chu Hsi is here accusing the Buddhists of believing in the existence of a personalized soul, while at the same time denying the existence of an impersonal and universal principle which he calls *li* or Law.

This raises the question as to what were Chu Hsi's own views on immortality. Such views do not assume a prominent place in his philosophy. Nevertheless, they are to be found expressed in a letter (in which he also deals with what he considers to be the Buddhist position on the subject), replying to a disciple, Lien Sung-ch'ing, who had addressed him on the matter. Chu's letters reads as follows:[2]

You have stated: "The Nature (*hsing*) of the universe[3] is my own Nature. How, then, can death be accompanied by sudden annihilation?"

As regards this doctrine, it is not, to be sure, quite incorrect. Nevertheless, I do not know whether in propounding it, you regard (the Nature of) the Universe as primary, or do you regard that of the ego (*wo*) as primary?[4] If you regard that of the Universe as primary, it follows that this Nature is then a Principle (*tao li*) common to the entire Universe, in which there are therefore no divisions as to what pertains to men and what to creatures, what to the "that" and what to the "this"; nor are there any distinctions as to death or life, antiquity or modern times. Although one is then to say that there is no annihilation at death, this does not mean that there is a survival of a personal ego.

But if you regard (the Nature of) the ego as being primary, this simply means that you recognize as existing in your own body a spiritual (*ching shên*), soul-like (*hun p'o*) something, having cognition and consciousness, which you look upon as being your Nature, and to which you cling in all its operations unto death, unwilling to let it go. To call such a thing "death

2. Cf. the *Chu-tzŭ wên-chi* (Collected Writings of Chu Hsi), *Ssŭ-pu ts'ung-k'an* edition, bk. (*chüan*) 41, p. 686, of the continuously paginated version bound in western fashion. The passage here quoted was originally pointed out to me by Professor Fung when I was attending his lectures on Chinese philosophy at Ts'ing Hua University, Peiping, in 1934-35.

3. Lit., "of Heaven and Earth," the usual Chinese term meaning universe. The reference here is to some sort of cosmic soul or spirit.

4. I.e., is the Nature (i.e., spirit or soul) of the individual to be regarded as subordinate to and forming part of the universal world Nature or soul, or is it free and self-sufficient?

without annihilation," is the height of egotistical thinking. How, then, may it merit, nevertheless, being included among the discussions on the theories of life or death, or the principles of the Nature (*hsing*) and of Destiny (*ming*)?

The doctrines of Buddhism are also fundamentally of this sort. Those of its devotees who are clever are themselves ever cognizant of the meanness of this (doctrine), which they therefore disparage and avoid discussing. On the contrary, they poke their heads into other doctrines pertaining to all sorts of mysterious and abstruse principles, so vast, like a boundless sea, that they cannot be approached for investigation. And yet the starting point of them actually does not lie outside this (doctrine of a personal ego, described above).

But if such (a doctrine) were really true, it would mean that within the single Nature (*hsing*) belonging to the Universe there were to exist innumerable other separate Natures of men and creatures. Each of these Natures would have its own particular domain, without impinging one upon the other. (The creatures possessing these Natures would), with a change of their name and surname, each be born of itself and die of itself.[5] (Such creatures), furthermore, would not be formed out of the creative activities of the *yin* and the *yang* in the Universe; nor would these *yin* and *yang* of the Universe have anything into which to infuse their creative activities.[6]

As you have taken the trouble to ask me on this question, I have accordingly answered following the receipt of your letter.

The question of whether Chu Hsi has here fairly represented the Buddhist position will be discussed later. At this place I should like to stress the point that Chu Hsi's general approach to the problem of immortality is in striking accord with that of well-nigh all other non-Buddhist Chinese thinkers who have ventured to discuss it. It is a really remarkable fact that, for millenia, China has been a stronghold of the so-called worship of ancestors, a cult presumably based upon a belief in the immortality of the soul; that it has been a country in which superstitious beliefs in spirits and ghosts of all kinds are rife among the common people; and yet that, when we study what China's sophisticated thinkers have had to say on the subject, we find either that they have hesitated to admit the possibility of immortality at all,

5. This is a difficult sentence, and I am not certain that I have caught the exact meaning. If I have, it would seem to refer to the Buddhist doctrine of successive rebirth, the rebirth of any given creature being regarded as occurring entirely separately and independently from that of any other creature.

6. The *yin* and the *yang* are respectively the principles of negation, quiescence, darkness, moisture, cold, etc., on the one hand, and of positiveness, activity, light, dryness, heat, etc., on the other, the interaction of which create all physical phenomena.

or have conceived of it only in general semi-pantheistic terms, rather than in terms of a personal survival. This should become clear after reading the brief survey that follows.

Confucius (B.C. 551-479), as is well known, was very reluctant to discuss matters of the other world. Once, on being asked by a disciple about man's duty to the spirits, he replied: "When still unable to do your duty to men, how can you do your duty to the spirits?" Likewise, when the same disciple ventured to ask about death, Confucius replied: "Not yet understanding life, how can you understand death?"[7]

Some three centuries or so later, we find the Confucian scholars adopting a very sophisticated attitude toward the subject, when they compiled the classic known to us today as the *Book of Rites*, a bulky work devoted to detailed descriptions of the ancient rituals and ceremonies. These very elaborate ceremonials were connected, to a large degree, with the burial and mourning rites, and sacrifices to the dead. Yet such rites are not, say the Confucians, performed for the benefit of the dead themselves, for the dead are dead, and therefore cannot possibly enjoy such things. The real reason for the existence of these ceremonies is that they provide an outlet for the emotions of the living. Through their observance, the bereaved relatives are permitted to express, in a sincere yet civilized manner, the grief which they experience on the loss of a beloved one. The performance of these ceremonies, in other words, acts as a catharsis for the emotions; yet at the same time, by serving as a fixed ritualistic framework within which such emotions may express themselves, the ceremonies prevent the emotions from running to excess and thus doing injury to those who experience them.[8]

Turning to the Taoist school, we find there quite a different point of view. Its greatest representative, Chuang Tzŭ (ca. B.C. 369-ca. 286), does, to be sure, express himself in one passage in a manner which seems to preclude any possibility of immortality. "Man," he writes in the second chapter of his book, "may say: there is immortality. But what is the use of this saying? When the body is decomposed, so with it is the spirit. Can it not be called very deplorable?"[9] In the

7. *Analects* XI, 11.

8. Cf. Fung Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, 1: *The Period of the Philosophers (from the Beginnings to circa 100 B.C.)*, translated from the Chinese by Derk Bodde (Peiping, 1937), ch. 14, esp. 344-46.

9. Cf. translation of Fung Yu-lan, *Chuang Tzŭ* (Shanghai, 1933), p. 47.

following chapter, nevertheless, he writes apropos of the death of the Taoist sage, Lao Tzŭ, as follows: "The fingers may be unable to supply further fuel.[10] But the flame is carried onward, and we know not when it may come to an end."[11]

These words seem to hint at some form of continued life after death. Actually, however, they are only an expression of Chuang Tzŭ's pantheistic and mystical view of the universe. This is a point made fully evident by other passages in his book, and hence Fung Yu-lan, in his comment on the present passage, is entirely correct when he interprets it as follows:[12] "This is Chuang Tzŭ's conception of immortality. His conception does not presuppose a spiritualistic universe. . . . The body of the individual must die; so does his soul, which is the function of the body. But the universe as a whole must eternally exist; so do those who identify themselves with the whole."

In fact, the general attitude of the Taoists toward immortality may be summed up as follows: In the universe there is only one all embracing stream of existence (called the Way or *Tao*); life and death are merely differing phases of this single existence; after death, therefore, we continue to exist as integral parts of this single stream of existence which never dies, but this in no way may be interpreted as signifying a personal form of immortality.[13] Such a concept is basic in the following passage from the *Huai-nan-tzŭ* (ch. 7).[14]

> Heaven and Earth, in their revolutions, permeate each other, and the "ten thousand things" combine to form the One. If we understand this One, there is no single thing that we cannot understand, but if we do not understand this One, there is no single thing that we can understand. For example, living in the world, I too am a thing. Can I not then realize that with me the things in the world are made complete, and that without me these things are incomplete? . . . In life I am added to the kind that have form, just as in death I am submerged among the kind that are formless. Yet the number of things (having form) is not increased by my life, nor is the thickness of the earth increased by my death. . . . The Creator's

10. I.e., the matter which forms our physical frames may come to an end.
11. Cf. Fung, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.
13. Cf. also Fung Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, pp. 236-39.
14. A work largely of Taoist inspiration, compiled under the patronage of Liu An, Prince of Huai-nan (died B.C. 122). Cf. translation of Evan Morgan, *Tao the Great Luminant* (Shanghai, 1934), pp. 62-63. This translation is often unreliable, and my own differs from it in a number of respects.

moulding and guidance of things is like a potter's kneading of the clay.[15] The earth which he has taken and formed into basins and bowls is in no wise different from that which he has left in the ground. And when the vessels which he has created become broken, they are dispersed and return to their source, where they are in no wise different from the basins and bowls as they were made.

Without the above passage as a guide, the following words from the *Huai-nan-tzŭ*, which occur only a few pages later on, might easily be open to misinterpretation:[16]

The body may die, but the spirit never undergoes change. With this absence of change it replies to the never ending thousand shifts and ten thousand turnings of the flux (of the universe). What undergoes change reverts to the formless, but what does not undergo change remains coexistent with Heaven and Earth.

If we turn now from Confucianism and Taoism to the minor schools of thought, we find expressed in various ways the same basic denial of a future personal existence. The famous egoist and hedonist, Yang Chu, for example, has many bitter remarks on the inevitable ending of all things by death, and the consequent futility of all striving during life. Here is one example:[17]

In life the myriad creatures all differ from each other, but in death they are reduced to a single uniformity. In life they may be virtuous or degenerate, honorable or despicable: that is how they differ from each other. But in death they will stink and rot and decompose: that is how they are all equal to each other. . . . Perhaps it may be ten years or perhaps a hundred years . . . they will all nevertheless die. They may be virtuous and sage, or they may be evil and degenerate; quite regardless they will die. In life they may be Yao or Shun;[18] in death they will only be rotting bones. In life they may be Chieh or Chou;[19] in death they too will be

15. References to the Creator (*tsao wu chê*) occur a number of times in Taoist writings. They are not to be taken literally as indicating a belief in a personal Creator, however, but merely as poetic metaphors.

16. Morgan, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

17. Cf. translation of Anton Forke, *Yang Chu's Garden of Pleasure* (London, 1912), pp. 40-41 (rather loosely translated). Yang Chu lived during the fifth century B.C. The little treatise here quoted bears his name and comprises the seventh chapter of the *Lieh-tzŭ*, a Taoist work. By many modern Chinese scholars, however, it is regarded as a forgery written by some unknown person of the third or fourth centuries A.D. But for our present study the question of its precise date or authorship is unessential.

18. Legendary sage emperors of antiquity noted for their virtue.

19. Tyrant rulers of antiquity noted for their cruelty.

rotting bones. In being rotten bones they are all alike. Who, then, will be able to distinguish their (former) differences?

As a final example, let us examine the views of the iconoclast, Wang Ch'ung (A.D. 27-ca. 97), who wrote a large work, the *Lun-hêng* (Critical Essays), to dissipate what he considered the irrationalties of his age. In his chapter, "On Death," he writes as follows:

Human death is like the extinction of fire. When a fire is extinguished, its light does not shine any more, and when man dies, his intellect does not perceive any more. The nature of both is the same. If people nevertheless pretend that the dead have knowledge, they are mistaken.[20]

A few lines below he expresses a view which is not far removed from that of the Taoists, though his is based upon a purely materialistic approach, whereas theirs is derived from a mystical awareness of the oneness of the universe:

During the months of the depth of winter, the cold air prevails and water freezes into ice. At the approach of spring, the air becomes warm, and the ice melts to water. Man's life in the universe is like the ice. The *yang* and the *yin* fluids[21] crystallize to produce man. When his years are concluded and his span is exhausted, he dies and thus reverts to these fluids. As spring water cannot freeze again, so the soul of a dead man cannot become a body again.

The above survey may suffice to indicate that Chinese philosophers either: (1) simply deny the survival of a soul after death; or (2), if they do speak of immortality, conceive of it never in personal terms, but only in the sense that the universe as a whole is never destroyed, and that therefore we, being parts of the universe, continue, after the bodily dissolution that accompanies death, to participate (in newly constituted forms) in the existence of that universe. Mo Tzŭ (ca. B.C. 479-ca. 381), indeed, remains the only non-Buddhist of really outstanding importance who has championed the idea of a personal immortality.[22] And Mo Tzŭ's school, as we know, completely dis-

20. Translation of Alfred Forke, *Lun-hêng*, in *Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen*, IX (1906), 376.

21. The negative and positive forces that create all physical phenomena. Cf. above, note 6.

22. Cf. his chapter, "On Ghosts," translated by Mei Yi-pao, *The Ethical and Political Works of Motse* (London, 1929), pp. 160-74. In this, Mo Tzŭ recounts many of the ghost stories current in his day as one of his "proofs" for the existence of spirits.

appeared a few centuries after his death, leaving almost no trace on later Chinese thought.

Chu Hsi's attitude toward immortality may thus be seen to be in harmony with that of the great bulk of non-Buddhist (especially Taoist) Chinese thinkers before his time. His attribution to the Buddhists, however, of a belief in personal survival, will come as something of a shock to those who remember that one of the most important tenets of early Buddhism was the denial of the existence of a personal ego or ātman. It may be questioned, however, how literally we should understand such a doctrine. Sir Charles Eliot, for example, warns us that

> the universality of the proposition really diminishes its apparent violence and nihilism. To say that some beings have a soul and others have not is a formidable proposition, but to say that absolutely no existing person or thing contains anything which can be called a self or a soul is less revolutionary than it sounds. It clearly does not deny that men exist for decades and mountains for milleniums; neither does it deny that before birth or after death there may be other existences similar to human life. It merely states that in all the world, organic and inorganic, there is nothing which is simple, self-existent, self-determined, and permanent; everything is compound, relative and transitory.[23]

Certainly it is true that, during the early centuries of Buddhism in China, the practical and realistic Chinese found it difficult to accept a philosophy which stresses the theory of karma and reincarnation, not only in the human but also in the animal and spirit worlds, yet at the same time denies the existence of a self or ātman that may pass through these stages of successive rebirth. Most of them, as a consequence, reversed the early Buddhist theory of anātman (non-ātman) by attributing to the Buddhists a belief that a definite self or soul does, indeed, survive through countless existences. This fact, which has not, so far as I know, been properly emphasized in western writings on Chinese Buddhism, is clearly brought out by the Chinese scholar, T'ang Yung-t'ung, who states quite categorically:

> From the very beginning the Chinese failed to comprehend the deep meaning of Buddhism [as to the non-existence of the ātman] . . . Buddhism

23. Sir Charles Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism, an Historical Sketch* (London, 1921), I, 191.

spoke about the endless cycle of transmigration. Because of this, the doctrine that the soul does not perish, but is carried on as a result of karma, became a current belief [among the Chinese].[24]

Among the several quotations cited by Professor T'ang in support of this statement, one of the earliest and most interesting is found in the *Li-huo lun* (The Raising of Doubts), a little work, also known after its supposed author as the *Mou-tzŭ*, which was written toward the end of the second century A.D. as a refutation of the anti-Buddhists.[25] In the twelfth chapter of this book, the supposed critic of Buddhism is represented as objecting to the author: "Buddhism says that after a man dies he must live again. I do not believe in the truth of such a judgment." To which the author counters: "The soul certainly does not die. It is only the body which decomposes. The body is like the stalk or leaf of the five kinds of grain, while the soul is like the germ or seed of those grains. The stalk and leaves, having been born, must inevitably die, but how can the germ or seed ever perish?"[26]

In later times this topic remained a subject of fierce debate between Buddhists and agnostic non-Buddhists, especially the Confucian scholars. Soon after the year A.D. 500, one of the latter, a man named Fan Chên, wrote a famous tract entitled the *Shên-mieh lun* (Essay on the Extinction of the Soul). In this he hotly attacked the Buddhist belief in an enduring soul, and raised many arguments against its survival after death, of which the following is a fair example:

The body supplies the material stuff for the soul; the soul gives function to the body. . . . The relationship of the soul to the material stuff (of its body) is like that of sharpness to a knife. The relationship of the body to its functions is like that of a knife to its sharpness. The sharpness is not the same as the knife, nor is the knife the same as the sharpness. Nevertheless, without sharpness there will be no (true) knife, and without the knife there will be no sharpness. I have never heard of sharpness having been

24. T'ang Yung-t'ung, *Han Wei Liang-Chin Nan-pei-ch'ao fo-chiao shih* (History of Buddhism during the Han, Wei, Two Chin, and Northern and Southern Dynasties) (Shanghai, 1938), pp. 89, 91. (This is a history of Chinese Buddhism from its introduction into China in the first century A.D. to about A.D. 600. It is easily the best Chinese work on the subject that has yet appeared.)

25. On this work cf. Paul Pelliot, "Meou-tseu ou les doutes levés," *T'oung pao*, 2nd series, XIX (1918-19), 255-433, esp. 255-86.

26. Pelliot, *op. cit.*, p. 301. The seed, which is produced from one plant and in its turn gives birth to another, represents the Buddhist idea of successive rebirth through karma.

preserved after the knife has been destroyed. How, then, can we suppose that the body becomes extinct, but that the soul continues to exist?[27]

Despite this and other attacks, belief in the existence of a permanent soul continued in later times to be widely held by Chinese Buddhists. Wei Shou (A.D. 506-572), for example, in the chapter on Buddhism contained in his *Wei shu* (History of the Wei Dynasty), expressly states that, according to Buddhist belief, "the soul is never destroyed."[28]

It is evident, therefore, that such a belief was for centuries common among the Chinese, at least among those who accepted Buddhism as a popular religion without delving into its higher abstrusities. Against this, Chu Hsi counters with his concept of a wholly impersonal type of immortality, according to which Law or *li*, though itself universal, becomes temporarily manifested as the Nature in an infinitude of ever changing physical objects, departing again upon the extinction of

27. For this and other such passages, cf. T'ang Yung-t'ung, *op. cit.*, pp. 470-73; also Alfred Forke, *Geschichte der mittelalterlichen chinesischen Philosophie* (Hamburg, 1934), pp. 266-74.

It may be remarked here parenthetically that, both in the case of this analogy and that of the seed of grain just quoted from the *Mou-tzŭ*, certain realistic and practical objections may be raised, i.e., that the seed under certain conditions may be destroyed (for example, it may be eaten), or that there may sometimes exist a knife that has lost its sharpness. The argument by analogy, however, which plays a very important part in Chinese philosophy, should not be judged too strictly from the point of view of realistic exactitude. It is not intended to serve as an absolutely water-tight proof, covering all possible alternatives in the case being argued. Rather it is a clarifying marker or beacon, erected by the writer to throw light upon the train of thought which he is trying to expound. If, under the normal conditions postulated for it by the writer, the analogy is an apt one, it helps to bring conviction to the mind of the reader. The latter will, in any case, not try to twist it to fit abnormal or unnatural situations, for he knows that the analogy was never designed to cover such situations, but only to represent a particular train of ideas. Thus, in the case of the analogy of the knife, a Chinese reader would not bother to argue that some knives are dull, for he knows that this is an accidental condition that lies outside the basic point being made, namely: that the purpose of all knives is to cut, and that therefore every knife, speaking from an ideal point of view, must possess sharpness if it is to be a true knife. The success of the analogy depends upon the extent to which it convinces the reader that, just as sharpness is a quality indivisible from the knife, so is the soul indivisible from the body, and hence must perish together with that body.

For further discussion of this and other favorite types of Chinese argument, cf. my *China's First Unifier* (Leiden, 1938), pp. 223-32, and "Types of Chinese Categorical Thinking," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, LIX, 2 (1939), 200-19.

28. Cf. translation of James R. Ware, "Wei Shou on Buddhism," *T'oung pao*, 2nd series, XXX (1933), 113. It is interesting to note that, in this passage, the term for soul is *shih shên* (lit., "Intelligent Spirit"), which is a mere transposition of the words *shên shih* ("Spiritual Intelligence") used by Chu Hsi, in his criticism of Buddhism quoted above, to designate the Buddhist concept of soul.

these objects, but continuing to exist ever unchanged within the metaphysical world of Law which transcends our sensory universe. In formulating such a theory, it seems clear that Chu Hsi was simply following the attitude generally held by Chinese philosophy, especially Taoism, while adapting it to his own particular metaphysical framework.

It is still questionable, nevertheless, whether Chu Hsi, in his criticism, has correctly apprehended the Buddhist point of view regarding the ego. It will be remembered that, in his letter, he asserts that if the doctrine of an enduring personal self "were really true, it would mean that within the single Nature (*hsing*) belonging to the Universe there were to exist innumerable other separate Natures of men and creatures. Each of these Natures would have its own particular domain, without impinging one upon the other," etc.

Such a picture of an anarchistic world of individual and unrelated Natures or personalities is surely a gross misrepresentation of the Buddhist point of view. Chu Hsi does not, to be sure, actually attribute it to the Buddhists themselves. He merely implies that such a picture represents the logical culmination of the Buddhist view if it is accepted. Such may have been his own honest opinion, but it is doubtful whether he could have found any prominent Buddhist who would have agreed with him. Buddhism, in fact, has, on the contrary, ever tended to stress the absolute interrelationship of all things in the universe, regardless of whether such relationship is to be conceived as taking place on the noumenal or the phenomenal plane. Even in early times, indeed, one of the chief arguments against the belief in a self or ātman was the assertion that every supposedly separate entity is really only a composite combination of other things; for example, what we call a chariot is not, in itself, a single entity, but is simply a convenient appellation for an aggregate of separate parts, such as wheels, shafts, body, etc.

Likewise Mahāyāna Buddhism, as developed in China, though it may have permitted, for popular purposes, the belief in the existence of a separate self, nevertheless always maintained that this self exists in close interrelationship with other selves and with the universe as a whole. Sometimes this belief took the form expressed by the *Nirvāṇa sūtra* (first translated into Chinese in A.D. 423), which maintained that the Dharmakāya or "Law-body" (i.e., the true essence of being or

the absolute) is the sole unchanging reality that underlies all changing phenomena, and is actually contained within all physical creatures. To quote a modern Chinese scholar on the subject:

> Not only is it the case that the Law-body of the Buddha eternally remains; the Law-body of each and every one of us sentient beings is moreover in no wise different from the Law-body of the Buddha. Because of this, "All sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature." . . . [The proponents of such a theory] maintained that the Buddha actually possesses a "Greater Ego" (*ta wo*). This doctrine, when it was heard of, horrified and startled those who maintained that there exists no ego (ātman).[29]

Another conception is that of "Mind-only," as found, for example, in the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra* (first translated into Chinese ca. A.D. 420). According to this work, there is an ālayavijñāna or "all-conserving mind," psychologically somewhat akin to our concept of the subconscious, the activities of which cause all sensory phenomena to appear, so that the entire universe, as we see it, is a product of our own minds. This ālayavijñāna, though superficially it seems to be a sort of a personal ego, is actually "the store or totality of consciousness, both absolute and relative, impersonal in the whole, temporarily personal or individual in its separated parts."[30] It is, therefore, something quite distinct from the usual concept of a personal ātman.[31]

There are, of course, an infinite number of variations of these doctrines as developed in the various schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Some, no doubt, could even be found approaching fairly closely the position taken by Chu Hsi himself, though a usual difference between the Buddhists and the Neo-Confucianists (including Chu Hsi) is that the former regarded the physical world as we see it to be illusory and therefore "void" or "empty"; the latter, on the contrary, regarded both the physical world of matter and the metaphysical world of Law as equally "real" and existent, even though the one undergoes constant change, whereas the other exists eternally unchanging.

29. Translated from Chiang Wei-ch'iao, *Chung-kuo fo-chiao shih* (A History of Chinese Buddhism), 2nd ed. (Shanghai, 1933), I, 20a.

30. William Edward Soothill and Lewis Hodous, *A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms* (London, 1937), p. 292a.

31. Cf. D. T. Suzuki, *Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra* (London, 1930), esp. pp. 241-98. For literature on the Yogācārya school, which developed this doctrine, cf. the Introduction by Clarence H. Hamilton to his translation of the *Wei shih er shih lun, or the Treatise in Twenty Stanzas on Representation-only*. American Oriental Series, vol. XIII (New Haven, 1938).

It would seem, therefore, that Chu Hsi, although he is said to have studied Buddhism in his youth, has been led by his antipathy toward it into a misinterpretation of the Buddhist doctrine at this point. This is not said with any aim of belittling his true greatness. The fact is that such misinterpretation was probably an almost inevitable consequence of the age and intellectual environment in which he lived. For in the China of the twelfth century, Buddhism, as a dynamic philosophical force, had already passed its peak, and had crystallized (with the possible exception of the Ch'an or Zen sect) into comparatively static dogma. It still, of course, held a powerful appeal for many millions of Chinese. Its higher philosophical speculations, nevertheless, were no longer attracting the attention of the best minds of China, many of whom were turning toward Neo-Confucianism, which in several ways represented a sort of philosophical nationalism. And with the rise and flowering of Neo-Confucianism, there came a reassertion of the ever latent tendency of Confucian scholars to look with distrust, or even active disapproval, upon whatever lies outside the realm of Confucian orthodoxy.

It is little wonder, therefore, that though the Neo-Confucian philosophers were undoubtedly deeply influenced by the general conceptions of Buddhism, probably few of them troubled to acquire a really broad and penetrating knowledge of Buddhism's more abstruse refinements. Especially would this be true of Chu Hsi, coming as he did at a time when Neo-Confucianism had already been raised by his predecessors to a position of dominance, and when Buddhism consequently was losing prestige. Chu Hsi's contemptuous reference to the Buddhists, therefore, as men who "poke their heads into other doctrines pertaining to all sorts of mysterious and abstruse principles," and his description of these principles as "so vast, like a boundless sea, that they cannot be approached for investigation," are not only a typically Confucian outburst of impatience with what cannot be conveniently fitted into the Confucian view of things; they are also to some extent an unconscious admission of misunderstanding and ignorance.

CATHOLICISM REVISES ITS NEW TESTAMENT

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Of late a better understanding between Roman Catholic and Protestant scholars has been in evidence. The Catholic Bible Congress of 1921, the organization of propaganda by radio, the establishment of Newman societies at colleges and universities, and recent educational pronouncements have witnessed an increasing Catholic response to the contemporary demands of the environment. The most significant adjustment to the demands of modern knowledge may well be the work upon the revision of the Vulgate. For the recently published reconstructed Challoner-Rheims version of the new Testament by the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine has been a welcome surprise to Protestant textualists.

Exiled English priests and educators gave their countrymen a translation of the New Testament in 1582. In the mid-eighteenth century, Bishop Challoner revised this Rheims-Douay version, and the present Catholic edition of the New Testament is based on the Challoner text. To secure this "simple and clear modern version," a critical attitude toward the Latin Vulgate was taken by comparing it with the "modern critical editions of the original Greek." Footnotes call attention to essential differences between the Latin and Greek texts. The Latin form of proper names has been retained. The verse-form of Challoner has been abandoned in favor of the paragraphing of the Rheims-Douay. Headings indicate the main divisions of the books. Marginal titles describe the contents of their subdivisions. Quotations from the Old Testament are centered. Poetry is printed as verse. Numerous out-of-date Challoner notes have disappeared. Brief introductions precede the various New Testament books. Glossary and maps complete a volume, beautiful to behold.

This edition was prepared to increase the devout reading of the New Testament by Catholics. Three popes are quoted as favoring the perusal of the Bible: "Our one desire for all the Church's children is that, being saturated with the Bible, they may arrive at the all-surpassing knowledge of Jesus Christ."

I

On matters of introduction, such as the date and authorship of the various New Testament documents, the volume supports the traditional attitude of the Church. St. Matthew wrote his gospel in Aramaic "between A.D. 42 and A.D. 50, or even later." St. Mark wrote the second gospel in Rome before A.D. 60; St. Luke his prior to A.D. 63; St. John his at Ephesus before A.D. 100. Acts was written by St. Luke about A.D. 63; St. Paul composed Romans at Corinth in A.D. 58; I Corinthians early in A.D. 57 at Ephesus; II Corinthians in Macedonia a little later; Galatians at Ephesus around A.D. 54; Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, and Philemon in a Roman prison in A.D. 63; I Thessalonians at Corinth, in A.D. 51; II Thessalonians soon after; I Timothy between A.D. 63-67; II Timothy in 66/67 at Rome; Titus 65/66; Hebrews, addressed to Jewish Christians in Palestine, A.D. 63 at Rome. James is assigned to A.D. 60-62; I Peter was written at Rome by Peter in A.D. 63/64; II Peter, at Rome by Peter in A.D. 66/67; I, II, III John at Ephesus at the close of the first century. Jude was written between A.D. 62 and 67 and the Apocalypse by St. John the Evangelist on Patmos, A.D. 96.

II

When this revised Catholic New Testament is compared with very recent Protestant translations, its conservatism is very noticeable. The longer conclusion of the Gospel According to St. Mark is still printed without any reference to the shorter conclusion, or to the Freer-Washington insertion, or to manuscripts that end at the eighth verse. Luke 3:22 does not call attention to the reading: "Thou are my beloved Son, *this day have I begotten thee.*" John 19:13 still lets Pilate sit down upon the judgment seat, whereas the more recent translations read: "Pilate made him [Jesus] sit in the judge's seat." The title "duty of father to virgin daughter" at I Corinthians 7:36-38 misses the point, and the text is a bit obscure. At I Corinthians 14:33b-36, there is no hint of the serious historical doubts attaching to these verses. At Romans 9:5, one expects a footnote calling attention to other possible renderings. Certainly at I Peter 3:19 the reading proposed by J. Rendel Harris, "It was in the Spirit that Enoch also went and preached to the imprisoned spirits" deserved notice.

III

Departures from the traditional English text are very frequent, as a sampling of a few passages demonstrates:

Passage	Douay Version	Confraternity Version
1. Matt. 3:2	Do penance	Repent
2. Matt. 6:11	Give us this day our supersubstantial bread	Give us this day our daily bread
3. Matt. 16:13	Whom do men say that the Son of man is?	Who . . .
4. Matt. 25:1	to meet the bridegroom and the bride	*and the bride* wanting in the best manuscripts
5. Matt. 26:27	And taking the chalice	And taking a cup
6. Matt. 26:28	For this is my blood of the new testament which shall be shed for many . . .	for this is my blood of the new covenant which is being shed for many . . .
7. Acts 26:28	And Agrippa said to Paul: In a little thou persuadest me to become a Christian	In a short while thou wouldst persuade me to become a Christian
8. Rom. 3:24	whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation through faith in his blood	whom God has set forth as a propriation by his blood through faith
9. Rom. 5:12	and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned	and thus death has passed into all men because all have sinned
10. Eph. 5:32	This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the church	This is a great mystery—I mean in reference to Christ and to the church
11. I Tim. 5:23	Do not still drink water, but use a little wine for thy stomach's sake and thy frequent infirmities	Stop drinking water only, but use a little wine . . .
12. Titus 3:10	A man that is a heretic, after the first and second admonition, avoid	A factious man avoid after a first and second admonition

Limitations on space forbid citing many other instances of variation from the Douay text. Numbers 1, 2, 6, 11, and especially 9 and 10, are radical. The original sin proof-text, Romans 5:12, and the marriage is a sacrament proof-text, Ephesians 5:32, have disappeared

from the text of the Catholic New Testament. Catholics and Protestants may now recite the Lord's Prayer in unison, although the Catholics would still become silent after "but deliver us from evil," while the Protestants would recite the doxology.

IV

It is in the footnotes to the new Catholic version that the consequences of recent historical criticism appear. The following are only samples:

MATT. 1:8. "Joram begot Ozias." The footnote adds: "Not directly, but with three generations intervening!"

MATT. 1:16. Footnote: "The genealogy is that of Joseph, the legal father of Jesus. Mary also belonged to the house of David. This is not affirmed in the gospels, but . . . ."

MATT. 13:55. "Is not his mother called Mary, and his brethren James and Joseph and Simon and Jude?" The Douay has this note: "That is, near relations to our Saviour," which is omitted in the revision.

MATT. 19:16. "He said to him 'Why dost thou ask me about what is good? One there is who is good, that is God . . .,' " where the revision says: "In the parallel texts, Mark 10:17 and Luke 18:18, our Lord asks, 'Why dost thou call me good?' which creates a theological difficulty not found in Matthew's Gospel: Jesus apparently disclaims being good and consequently being God. . . ."

MATT. 24:32-36. Here the revision has quite a time with "this generation!"

MATT. 27:46. "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" Footnote: *(these words)* "taken in their context do not express anything like despair."

LUKE 3:23-38. The genealogy is admitted to be that of Joseph.

LUKE 22:20. "This is the new covenant in my blood, which shall be shed for you." Comment: "In regard to the words of the consecration of the cup, Matthew and Mark follow one formula, whereas Luke and Paul follow another. The meaning, however, is substantially the same. *Which shall be shed for you:* in the Vulgate, whereas the present, 'Which is being shed for you' is found in the Greek." Here the Vulgate is fatal to the doctrine of transubstantiation.

JOHN 8:56. "Abraham your father rejoiced that he was to see my day. He saw it and was glad." Footnote: "Abraham can be said to have seen Christ's day either in faith and prophetic vision, or from his place in limbo when Christ was born."

JOHN 19:34. "But one of the soldiers opened his side with a lance, and immediately there came out blood and water." There is no note in Douay,

but the revision says: "*Blood and water:* this phenomenon was considered a miracle by Origen. The Fathers generally see in it a deeper meaning: the sacred mysteries issuing from the side of Christ, the birth of the Church as Eve was taken from the side of Adam, etc. The fact may be explained naturally as the effect of the piercing of the pericardial sinus. Still it is generally accepted as miraculous."

Acts 2:46. "And continuing daily with one accord in the temple, and breaking bread in their houses . . . ," the revision has: "there was no sudden break with the past, but the disciples had their own sacrifice, the Eucharist, *in their houses* where they also took their evening meal beforehand, as our Lord did at the institution of the Eucharist. Some take 'breaking bread' in the sense of an ordinary meal, and not, as in v. 42, in the sense of the Eucharist."

Rom. 3:20. "For by the works of the Law no human being shall be justified before him. . . ." Comment: "It does not follow from St. Paul's statement that no man is justified by the works of the Law, that good works are not necessary for salvation. The justification of which St. Paul here speaks is the infusion of sanctifying grace which alone renders a person supernaturally pleasing in the sight of God. This cannot be obtained either by the observance of the Law or by any other work of unregenerate man."

Rom. 5:12. "Because all have sinned. . . ." This requires an extensive note: "general statements such as this are to be understood with their obvious exceptions, and also with exceptions that can be established from other sources of revealed truth. Thus, obviously, Jesus Christ is an exception to this general statement. The Church, the official interpreter of the Scriptures, teaches us also in view of the future sufferings of Christ, His Blessed Mother was preserved from original sin."

Rom. 6:4. "For we were buried with him by means of Baptism unto death," Note: "St. Paul alludes to the manner in which Baptism was ordinarily conferred in the primitive Church, by immersion. The descent into the water is suggestive of the resurrection to a new life. St. Paul obviously sees more than a mere symbol in the rite of Baptism. As a result of it we are incorporated into Christ's mystical body and live a new life."

I Tim. 3:12. "A bishop, then, must be married but once." The note reads: "Priestly celibacy as a law is of later ecclesiastical institution. No condemnation of second marriages in general is intended."

Jude 9. "Yet when Michael the archangel was fiercely disputing with the devil about the body of Moses . . . ." The note in Douay differs very considerably from that in the revision, which reads: "This dispute between Michael and the devil is nowhere else recorded in the Scriptures. The cause of the dispute is not assigned, but it is certain the devil wished to make some evil use of the body of Moses."

Jude 14. Here the note in the revision indicates great advance in knowledge; it reads: "The 'Book of Henoch' is apocryphal. St. Jude does not

here approve the entire book, but only this prophecy. *Has come:* so certain is His coming that it is represented as accomplished."

Rev. 20:2. "And he laid hold on the dragon . . . and bound him for a thousand years." This is explained thus: "*A thousand years:* not to be taken literally. It refers to a considerable length of time and signifies that, after the destruction of hostile kings and the chaining of the dragon, the Church will enjoy a long era of peace. During this era Christ will reign over the souls of men, and Christians, through their influence over the world, will reign with Christ."

Rev. 20:7. The Gog and Magog reference is interpreted thus: "After a thousand years the nations will attack the Church. These nations are designated as Gog and Magog. The names are taken from Ezechiel. In rabbinical books the names were used to signify the nations that would rise against the Messias. The names are to be understood figuratively and signify the earthly powers that will make the last onslaught against the Church."

V

A final series of passages and notes implying the acceptance of the results of historical criticism includes John 5:3b-4, 7:53-8:11, Acts 8:37, 15, 34 and I John 5:7.

John 5:3b-4 is the well-known description of what occurred at the "pool called in Hebrew Bethsaida, having five porticoes" when the angel came down to trouble the water. The note admits that these verses are not found in many Greek manuscripts and that the wording varies, even in the codices of the Vulgate, but accepts it as second century material.

John 7:53-8:11 is the story of the woman taken in adultery. The text makes no changes, and the note acknowledges that "this passage is wanting in many Greek manuscripts and in some others, it is found in Chapter 21" but insists upon "its right to be included among the Sacred Writings."

Acts 8:37, the famous Baptist proof-text, "And Philip said, 'If thou dost believe with all thy heart, thou mayest.' And he answered, and said, 'I believe Jesus Christ to be the Son of God'" is printed within brackets and therefore doubtful, and a footnote explains that it is missing "in the best Greek and Vulgate manuscripts and by other authorities."

Acts 15:34, "Silas however decided to stay there and so Judas departed alone for Jerusalem" is likewise enclosed within brackets, because "not in the Greek, or in the best codices of the Vulgate."

The greatest surprise appears at I John 5:7, and the text still prints the passage regarding "the three heavenly witnesses." But the footnote reads: "According to the evidence of many manuscripts, and the majority of commentators, these verses should read: And there are three who give testimony, the Spirit, and the water, and the blood; and these three are one. The Holy See reserves to itself the right to pass finally on the origin of the present reading."

The Authorized Version also contains the passage regarding "the three heavenly witnesses," but the Revised Version and all modern translations of the New Testament omit it. The verse is not found in a single independent Greek manuscript. The first to quote it was Priscillian in the late fourth century. After that, more and more Latin manuscripts cite it. It is not once quoted in a genuine work of any of the Greek fathers, and it is not discoverable in any ancient eastern version. Most ancient and valuable codices of the Latin version omit it. Up to the time of Priscillian, no Latin father quotes it. Jerome's Vulgate and Alcuin's revision did not contain it. Calvin regarded the verse with suspicion but retained it. The first editions of the Erasmian Greek testament failed to print it. It was inserted in the third edition of Erasmus and thus made its way into the Authorized Version.

The origin of the passage is as interesting as its appearance in the Authorized Version. Toward the close of the fourth century, the gloss is first quoted as scripture by Priscillian of Spain. The form in which it is found in Priscillian's *Liber Apologeticus* is as follows: "Thus John says, there are three which bear witness on earth: water, flesh and blood and these three are *in unum*. And there are three who bear witness in Heaven: Father, Word and Spirit. *And these three are one in Christ Jesus.*" Priscillian was an opponent of the orthodox dogma regarding the trinity and leaned toward a pan-Christismic view. The text in this form could be employed to sustain his theory. The Roman Catholic theologian, Kuenstle, after making an elaborate inquiry into the origin of the comma, concluded that its presence in completed form in the text of I John was due to Priscillian himself. The verse later became the chief proof-text for the doctrine of the trinity. If Kuenstle's hypothesis should ultimately prove tenable, the tragedy of the verse would be that, having been originally used against a trinitarian belief, it became in modified form the foundation of this

view. In reply to Kuenstel, it has been objected that the opponents of Priscillian never accuse him of falsifying the text, and, further, that the verse is quoted in several orthodox works of the fifth century. In view of Jerome's description of the condition of the text of the New Testament at the very period when our gloss first appears, too much weight need not be given to these objections. Jerome, in his letter to Pope Damasus in 383 explaining why he found a revised edition of the Latin text necessary, says: "If we are to pin our faith to the Latin texts, it is for our critics to tell us which; for there are almost as many forms of texts as there are copies." Augustine gives testimony to the same effect: "If any perplexity arises from the diversities of the Latin texts we must, of course, yield to the Greek."

The revised Catholic New Testament renders I Corinthians 10:24, "Let no one seek his own interests but those of his neighbor." The Vulgate had translated this verse: "Let no man seek his own but that which is another's." Wyclif had put it: "No man seek that thing that is his own but that thing that is of another." Luther wrote: "Niemand suche was seyn ist sondern eyn yglicher was eyns andern ist." Tyndale desired to clarify the situation and so added two very innocent words to the text: "Let no man seek his own *prophet* [i.e., profit] but let every man seek his neighbor's *wealth*." Coverdale also sought to be helpful and therefore adopted: "Let no man seek his own *profit*, but let everyman seek another's *wealth*." The Authorized Version popularized the new translation: "Let no one seek his own but every man another's *wealth*." This would be very serious for private property.

This brief survey of the revised American Catholic New Testament indicates that American Catholicism is both accepting some of the results of the historical method of interpreting the Bible, and encouraging its laity to become familiar with those results by urging the day by day perusal of the New Testament. This exhortation ties in very well with the particular Roman Catholic insistence upon making the experience of the eucharist a point of departure for social action. If, now, American Catholicism were to continue this work of grace in the reconstruction of its theology, the American Catholic laity would feel much more at home in the twentieth century world.

IMAGO DEI

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I

An adequate understanding of the Christian conception of man is under obligation to the history of the doctrine throughout three millenia of Hebrew-Christian experience and reflection. In no field of speculation, perhaps, is the stamp of primitive mentality and behavior more persistent and influential than in the doctrine of man. Even in our own time we lose much if we lose completely the whole set of associations which words like "soul," "spirit," and "life" suggest to the primitive. In the present case, our problem is accentuated by the consideration that such language of primitive anthropology and psychology as we have has come to us through the loom of the speech of the Semitic Orient. As the grandson of Sirach commented long ago, "the same things uttered in Hebrew, and translated into another tongue, have not the same force in them." This is preeminently true of the transformation of Semitic into Greek. The history of the Christian doctrine of man always labors under this inevitable source of confusion.

A second difficulty is that neither in the Old Testament nor in the New are anthropological terms employed with anything like the consistency and precision that we desire. For one thing, the ancient Hebrew did not think of scientific disciplines like psychology and anthropology, and shows no interest in permanently valid concepts or definitions. Popular employment of psychological terms is notoriously loose and inaccurate. Witness our uncritical use of "personality," "spirit," and "soul." Biblical anthropological vocabulary is characterized by great diversity and inconsistency, and consequently the proof-text method, whether employed by the Church Fathers, the Reformers, theologians, or even biblical scholars, is nowhere more precarious than here. It would seem that we are just beginning to approach the problem of the biblical conception of man with a fair degree of competence. When one considers that the Bible has been the chief source of Christian speculation on this subject, one can understand why traditional views are probably destined for revision.

We are confronted by a third difficulty of another kind. There is the dilemma of understanding the Scriptures in the light of their historical development, on the one hand, and in the light of their present form and order, on the other. The former is the approach to which we are committed as scholars and historians; the latter is faithful to the kind of Bible Christian theologians and the average Christian have always known until comparatively recent times. The one is conscious of differences everywhere; the other, of unity and consistency. The one feels that biblical theology always involves some distortion of the actual facts, as the most important recent book on the doctrine of man plainly shows; the other chafes under the restraints which the Old and New Testament historian would seem to place upon it. The point we wish to make is that we must do justice to both points of view; either one alone would give us a false picture for a vast area of historical development.

II

In view of what has just been said, the following attempt seeks to steer a clear course through the maze of inconsistencies which characterize biblical anthropological passages. The surest clue is to be found in Genesis 2:7, and if we stick to it we are not likely to go far wrong. The Hebrew may be rendered literally as follows: *And YHWH God molded man ('adam) dust from the ground ('adamah).* That God fashions the body and that, therefore, it is good is germane to all Hebrew thought. The idea of an evil body is utterly alien to the whole Old Testament. It is clear from numerous other passages that the wonder of the creation of the first man is repeated in the creation of every person. The realism with which this is repeatedly expressed is worth observing. In one of the most wonderful of all ancient hymns we read:

> For thou didst create my vitals
> Thou didst weave me in the womb of my mother
> I praise thee for the awful wonder of my birth (Moffatt's paraphrase)
> Thy works are wonderful.
> My bones were not hidden from thee,
> When I was made in secret,
> And moulded in the lowest parts of the earth.
>
> (Ps. 139:13-15. See also Job 10:1-18)

All the various organs (more than eighty are referred to in the O.T.) are fashioned by God, each with its special psychical function,[1] yet all are inter-related through intimate concatenation of parts to make of the body, a term of no anthropological importance among the early Hebrews, a totality.

"And he breathed in his nostrils the breath (*neshamah*) of life, and man became a living soul (*nephesh chayyah*)." Like the body, the breath in man comes from God. Animals also have living breath in them, but it is not said that God breathed it into them. With the *neshamah* of God in him, man is a soul, a living person, a self. Without it he is nothing but *dust,* or *flesh.* Here is the Hebrew man, not a trichotomous but, in contrast to the Greek man, a dichotomous being. But this is not dualism, for the Hebrew living person is one and indivisible. When he dies, the breath or spirit returns to God who gave it, and the body to dust (cf. Pss. 90:3; 104:29; 146:4; Eccles. 12:7; esp. Job 34:14 f.). When at the end of the Old Testament the Hebrew achieves a significant view of future life, it is a resurrection of the body in contrast to the Greek conception of the soul's immortality.

It is the great merit of Johannes Pedersen, of the University of Copenhagen, to have described correctly the psychological character of the soul's functioning:

> The soul is an entirety with a definite stamp, and this stamp is transmuted into a definite will. The Israelite has no independent term for will as we understand the word. He does not recognize the will as an independent feature or force of the soul. . . . The soul is totality; . . . *the will is the whole tendency of the soul.*

The importance of this subject for the history of the doctrine from ancient to modern times is so great that an additional observation of Pedersen's deserves citation:

> The soul cannot, as long as it is a soul, desist from being a connected whole, characterized by volition and action. Therefore the Israelite manner of *thinking* is of a different kind from ours. What we call objective, that is to say, inactive, theoretical thinking without further implications, does not exist in the case of the Israelite. He naturally knows mind-images, which are only flashes, or so peripheric as to leave no deeper impress upon the

1. See H. Wheeler Robinson's essay on "Hebrew Psychology" in *The People and the Book* (Edited by A. S. Peake. Oxford, 1925), pp. 353-82.

soul. And yet there is a decisive difference between what is outside and what is inside the soul. That which is received into the soul must influence the character of the whole, just as, in its turn, it takes its character from the given stamp of totality. He who writes truth and faithfulness on the table of the heart (Prov. 3:7) lets these forces enter into his soul and determine its direction.[2]

Had Thomas Aquinas, and a host of others before and after him, properly understood this, the history of the doctrine of man would have been far different from what it is.

The word *nephesh*, infelicitously rendered *soul* in lieu of anything better, is derived ultimately perhaps from the Arabic *nafsun*, meaning *breathing*. It is natural that it should have soon become identified with breath, though this, I believe, was the cause of much confusion in later thinking. The *nephesh* (soul) of the flesh, is said, for example, to reside in the blood (Lev. 17:11), and elsewhere the blood is the *nephesh* (Deut. 12:23). A swift examination of any standard Hebrew lexicon will show how diverse the meaning of *nephesh* comes to be. Brown-Driver-Briggs lists the following among many minor meanings: soul, living being, life, self, person, desire, appetite, emotion, and passion.

One of the most significant of the many words to be identified with the soul was spirit (*ruach*). This word was also used with a variety of meanings, but was not equated with man's soul until Ezekiel and after. Niebuhr's statement that *ruach* and *nephesh* are used interchangeably in the Old Testament is mistaken, as a careful reading of even his secondary sources would have shown.[3] Ernst Sellin says the two terms are used quite promiscuously in the Old Testament, but this is true of but one of the many references he cites. By the time of Ezekiel, that colossal disturber of the development of Hebrew religion, we encounter a sharp change. From this time on *spirit* develops in parallel construction to *soul* or *nephesh*. Another point at which Niebuhr needs correction is the astonishing statement that the prophets are always said to be animated by the *ruach* of God.[4] Almost the opposite is true; indeed there seems to be a studied attempt on the part of the great majority of the prophets to avoid referring their experience to the activity of the spirit.

2. Johannes Pedersen, *Israel, its Life and Culture*. (London, 1926), p. 103.
3. *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, p. 151.
4. *Ibid.*

In its main lines, the New Testament follows the Old in its anthropological presuppositions as these are mediated by the Septuagint. Such change as there is, is due to the influence of later Judaism and Greek thought. But what gives to the customary terminology an entirely new and powerful drive is the personality of Jesus, the experiences generated by his message and personality, and not least of all, the Old Testament passages predicting the descent of the spirit in the Messianic age. It is not surprising, therefore, that spirit (*pneuma*) should assume a central place in the New Testament conception of man, above all in the Pauline anthropology. Three of the characteristic Pauline terms, *heart*, *soul*, and *spirit*, are clearly drawn from the O.T., but the emphasis upon flesh seems to suggest another influence. Paul contrasts the spirit (*pneuma*) with flesh (*sarx*) in such a way as to associate the former with the spiritual and higher life and the latter with sin; they are similarly contrasted as inner and outer. It would certainly seem that Paul has here become Greek, yet Wheeler Robinson thinks that the development of the doctrine of the future life and Paul's personal conflicts are sufficient to explain his idea. But it certainly seems like a far cry from Hebraism. Still, the activity of the spirit is more like the Hebrew *ruach*, with its associations of activity and energy, than the pervading *pneuma* of the Greek. In the Johannine writings, the antithesis between God and the world is sharpened with such attendant contrasts as light and darkness, spirit and flesh, life and death, righteousness and sin.

III

With this general and partial statement of biblical anthropology as a background, we may endeavor to describe the biblical conception of man in so far as it relates to what is good and great in him.

1. *Man is God's creature.* He is a created being who derives his existence, the mode of his living, its bounds and its destiny, and his function as a human being from God. Man's life is derivative, and it is God to whom he owes it. *It is he that hath made us and not we ourselves* (or what is probably the true rendering: *and we are his*). We are not our own, but bear upon ourselves the imprint of God's primal fashioning. No suggestion of a demiurge or the various hypostases which later gained ascendancy in Judaism mar man's creation

by God. *He knows our frame; he remembers that we are dust.* Yet in this dust he breathed the breath of life.

2. *Man is the goal of God's creation.* Later times could substitute *Israel* or the *Christian community* as God's purpose, but not classical biblical thought. This is poignantly illustrated in the second creation narrative: here YHWH God molds man first of all things and then is busily occupied in making a home for him. Conversely, the first story makes man the consummation of the creative acts. He is not created until everything has been prepared for him. The perfection of this man is described in a passage which preserves for us something of the original myth:

> Thus says YHWH God: You were the seal of perfection, full of wisdom, and complete in beauty. You dwelt in Eden, the garden of God. . . . On the day when you were created, I placed you with the guardian cherubs on the holy hill of God. . . . You were perfect in your ways from the day when you were created, till guilt was discovered in you. Ezek. 28:12b-15 (American translation).[5]

The key verse for man as the image of God is given in the priestly narrative of the creation. "Let us make man in our image, in our likeness, and let him have dominion. . . . So God created man in his own image." From a critical point of view, it is wrong to follow this story with the story of the fall, but we need to remember that it has been so read almost universally in the history of Christian theology, even to our own day. This raises the central question involved in the Christian view of man. Just how corrupt is he? What may we rightly expect from him? How good *can* he be? What are the limits by which he is circumscribed? We need not examine the various levels of interpretation that have been given to the fall. What is important, in view of the place the Bible occupies in the history of the subject, is the actual biblical portrait of a man in relation to the fall. First, it should be observed that man continues to be described as the image of God after the fall, both the fall in the garden and the second more influential fall up to Christian times, the fall of the angels (see Gen. 5:1, 3 and 9:6). What is significant to the historian of religion is that the Priestly writer responsible for the Pentateuch in its final form ignores the fall completely and is totally unaware of any hereditary implications.

5. Cf. Job 15: 7 f.

This affirmative view of man as the continuing image of God is given us in the oldest commentary on the famous Genesis passage. In the eighth Psalm the poet chants the wonders of the divine glory in all the earth. But the theme of the poem is man. For a moment he is over-awed by the starry heavens above and feels man's insignificance, but then, with a sudden shift of thought, he cries:

> Thou hast made him but little lower than God,
> And dost crown him with glory and honour!
> Thou makest him rule over the works of thy hands,
> Thou hast put all things under his feet.

It would almost seem that in his poetic frenzy the writer would place the crown of divinity upon man, for he describes him in terms (*glory and majesty*) which are ordinarily attributed to God. We must be careful to emphasize that the poet is not writing a theological statement. It is an ecstatic outburst. But none the less, the close connection with Genesis 1 suggests what this passage means to him. In both places man is lord of creation; all things are under his dominion; he is God's vicegerent. Here as everywhere, Nature is subordinate to man (cf. esp. the theophanies in Ex. 3-4; Ex. 19; Amos 4:6-11, Isaiah 40-66).

What is remarkable about the story of the fall is that nowhere in the Old Testament is it used as the basis for man's corruption. Indeed, nowhere in the Old Testament (nor in the New!) do we have so dark a picture of man's corruption as is painted by Martin Luther and Karl Barth. Hebrew man, it must never be forgotten, is healthy, alert, and responsible. In the centuries before Christ, tides of pessimism swept over the Near East. Iranian influences cut wide and deep into the religions of the time. Against this background it is remarkable to read the Synoptic Gospels. To appreciate their uniqueness and freshness, one should read these Gospels in the context of Hebrew literature from B.C. 200 to A.D. 200. Their arresting simplicity, their striking naïveté, their healthiness and realism, their want of romanticism on the one hand, and of brooding pessimism, on the other, make them, I believe, something that is truly sui generis. If one doubts this, let him examine the exhaustive parallels of Strack-Billerbeck.

What is it then that constitutes in man the image of God? To this question Christian theologians have addressed themselves almost throughout the history of theology. In no realm has the distinction

between the Greek and Hebrew modes of thinking proved more striking. Where Plato's influence was strong, and especially through the impress of Aristotle, the rational character of man has been exalted as that which was divine in him. Reinhold Niebuhr has repeatedly criticized what he believes to be a gross distortion of biblical thinking on this subject. His most recent book, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, is his most competent and best documented treatment of the subject. He makes many characteristically acute observations, especially on Augustine. The book should be read with Calhoun's vigorous criticism (*Journal of Religion.* XXI, 473-80).[6] Niebuhr's criticism of Greek thinking undoubtedly goes too far, but we have historic reasons for fearing the excessive Hellenizing of Christian faith. Moreover, we must always be careful to distinguish between biblical meanings of ideas and modern attempts to pour new meaning into biblical terms.

If we forget completely the whole proof-text procedure and read through the Scriptural record as a whole, we receive a dominant impression which may provide another answer to the question of the image of God. Such a reading reveals that it is man's will that is primary in him, as we observed in Pedersen's discriminating description of the character of the soul in Hebraism. God places man in the garden, but the moment he does so, he faces him with a situation in which he is involved in the dilemma of choice and decision. It is the genius of Hebraism to guard the idyllic *Urzeit* from unbridled romanticism. Similarly, when Israel stands before the mount of her covenanting to receive the divine theophany, she hears at once the divine commands. This is characteristic of Old Testament thought everywhere: divine revelation is revelation which places man before a choice, a decision which must be made. The highest purpose of man —his supreme task and function—is to do the will of God (cf. Micah 6:1-8). It is not a coincidence that Christian faith sees the Son of God wrestling in the torment of decision before he goes to the cross. This scene must be viewed as part, the culminating part to be sure, of the whole panorama of historic Hebrew-Christian faith. It is the image of God in man which makes him a decision-making person. His ability

6. The flesh may, at times, suggest man's mortality and frailty and may be the instrument of evil desires and passions (so W. D. Davidson in HERE), but this is merely secondary. That the body is of God's fashioning is primary.

to choose, the freedom implied in his choice, his sense of difference and value—these surely are aspects of what is divine in him.

3. *Man is a socius, a member of a group.* The strong sense of solidarity characteristic of ancient tribal life has left its stamp upon biblical religion from beginning to end. An individual is understood by his relation to the group of which he is a part. But in Israel the development of the idea of the covenant made the individual, first of all, a member of the community of God (*ben berith*). This prior loyalty is the basis for the prophetic message; it is also the basis for the continuity and survival of Israel beyond the destruction of the nation. For the most part the isolated man is a phenomenon in the Old Testament. *Ein Mensch ist kein Mensch* (Ludwig Köhler, *Theologie des alten Testaments*, p. 113). Isolation of a person from his community, as in the prophetic call, is always something remarkable. Again, man as *socius* is man in history. There is comparatively little cosmogony or cosmology in the Bible. All this has been eliminated or reduced to a minimum in order that the community may emerge. Finally, with the decline and disintegration of the nation and the deepening of ethical insights, the individual begins to appear. But even then, the idea of Israel is not lost. It was natural, even for the primitive Christian community, to think of itself as the new Israel. Despite the common emphasis upon Protestantism's reversion to Scripture and especially to the Old Testament, the Catholic Church is in this respect closer to the social organization implicit in biblical religion.

This conception of man as *socius* is enriched and deepened in the New Testament thought concerning man. Here the family ethic of Jesus dominates the Synoptic Gospels. The obligation which men bear to each other is the obligation of men bound by the intimate ties of family relationship. They are brothers who do the will of God, who is Father. The full import of this relationship becomes clear in the wider discussion of the New Testament evaluation of man. The First Epistle of John expresses this family relationship of men with a mystical warmth and intimacy paralleled by no other writing. "Whoever loves his brother is always in the light . . . but whoever hates his brother is in darkness. . . . We are God's children. . . . Dear friends, let us love one another, for love comes from God, and everyone who loves is a child of God" (2:10; 4:6-7).

4. *Man may become a son of God.* He is the object of the Divine Love. God is like the shepherd who leaves his ninety and nine for one lost sheep. He goes to infinite bother about it. Jesus presses the command even to loving one's enemies; in so doing, men show themselves sons of God. The peacemaker is a son of God. These observations of Jesus achieve greater meaning when we read them against the background of his own call: "Thou are my beloved son, my chosen" (Goodspeed). Jesus' view of men becomes even more striking in his treatment of them. He is concerned for them, cares about them, evokes their willing responses, never subordinates them. He "gets at" them and faces them with themselves in strikingly fresh ways. Above all, *he places them before decisions.* The rich young ruler, Zacchaeus, the lawyer with the query about eternal life, the disciples at their nets, the volunteers whom he calls to follow him—these are but a few instances of this amazing yet essentially Hebraic quality in Jesus. And he interests himself in persons of every variety, chief of all the outcast and disinherited men. "The Son of Man came to seek and to save that which is lost."

This emphasis on man's capacity for divine sonship in the Gospels is raised to an entirely new level in the writings of Paul. It is here that the doctrine of the spirit becomes centrally important. The spirit is the agency by which the Christian church finally chose to express the way in which the Jesus of history becomes Jesus in the experience of the Christian, and it was Paul who fitted the term for such use![7] The eighth chapter of Romans is of peculiar importance here, though it does not stand alone. Professor Dodd, in his commentary on Romans, says we should render 8:14 as follows: "Those who are guided by the Spirit are sons of God." Moreover, Paul passes from "Spirit of God" to "Spirit of Christ" to the Spirit within ourselves almost imperceptibly. "The Spirit itself testifies with our spirits that we are God's children, heirs also; heirs of God, and fellow heirs with Christ, if we really share his suffering in order to share his glory too." These are impressive words, but the succeeding section confirms Paul's meaning. "For creation is waiting with eager longing for the sons of God to be disclosed." The consummation of creation's purpose is "the glorious freedom of the children of God." Such statements

7. Frank Chamberlain Porter, *The Mind of Christ in Paul* (New York, 1930), p. 63.

must not be interpreted too liberally, perhaps, but even at their minimum, they say much.

5. In all that has been said above, it is clear that there is rapport between man and God and that God is concerned over maintaining this rapport. It may even be one of judgment, but a judgment that is never final or decisive. Man is ever of child of grace. This is vividly pictured in the second creation story, that vast reservoir of nascent theology, where YHWH makes skin tunics for the exiled pair and, in his wrath, nevertheless remembers mercy. This stress upon the grace of God sounds a consistent note in the Old Testament; and in the theology of Paul all is of grace, for by grace are men saved. The culmination of the relationship of God to man is *love;* the great imperative for man's existence is love. Through loving relations to God and man he understands his existence and fulfils his destiny, and God is portrayed as sending his son into the world for man's redemption. Finally, man is a being who worships. It is possible for him to come into relation with his God, even in the darkness of his sin. There is a response to his cry of repentance and contrition; the gospel of the entire Bible is one of reconciliation. And man can prostrate himself before the infinite majesty of the Divine Presence without any ulterior thought but to glorify God and to enjoy him forever.

6. Another respect in which the New Testament goes far beyond the Old is its conviction that man is immortal. The period of terrible persecution and tragedy antecedent to the Maccabean uprising finally succeeded in breaking up the this-worldly matrix of Hebrew-Jewish religious thinking. The demand that faith's optimistic asseverations should find validation became so intense by history's apparent denial of them that all barriers finally broke, and man's significant survival in another world was affirmed, albeit with the greatest diversity of conception. The Gospels and Epistles agree that those who are become the sons of God, in whom the Spirit of Christ has become a reality (to use Pauline terms), are deathless. Such objects of God's care and love will not be destroyed.

7. Finally, the conception of man as made in the image of God is present in many passages of the New Testament. The work of Christ is the restoration of the *imago dei* in man. Through the sin of Adam this image has been broken and disfigured, but in Christ "all of us, reflecting the splendor of the Lord in our veiled faces, are being

changed into the likeness of him, from one degree of splendor to another, for this comes from the Lord who is the Spirit" (II Cor. 3:18). Christ is himself the image of God, the restored image, the second Adam, a new creation, and he is the first-born of many brothers, as Paul says in what is probably the most notable of Pauline passages (Rom. 8:29). In quite a different mood, a later writer connects the Synoptic portrait of man with the idea of the *Imago:* "Now are we children of God, and it is not yet made manifest what we shall be. We know that, if he shall be manifested, we shall be like him; for we shall see him even as he is" (I John 3:2).

IV

The doctrine of the *imago dei* is one side of the Christian view of man. Any statement of man's greatness and divine capacities must always be accompanied by another which describes his sinfulness. Here are the shoals of Scylla and Charybdis through which contemporary thought concerning man is forced to sail. We are all familiar with exaggerations on both sides. Today, in a time of unparalleled darkness, it is no wonder that man's sin is receiving much attention. It would be unfortunate if it were not so. When man's very existence seems threatened by forces of his own making, it is natural for us to brood over man's sinfulness. The optimistic descriptions of the nature and destiny of man in liberal Protestantism a comparatively few years ago sound more archaic than the most pessimistic passages in the Pauline epistles. Yet we have all seen the pendulum swing sharply in the opposite direction. We need to do justice to both the goodness and the sinfulness of man. It is this which biblical thought, in its general perspective and wider ranges, accomplishes admirably. When we stress one side or another of man's nature, the reason is usually that we are concentrating on a single scriptural passage, or even reading the passage outside of its total context.

To summarize then: Man is a living being made in the image of God. The Old Testament and a large part of the New know nothing of the lost image. If I am not mistaken, the Synoptic Gospels, despite the Pauline editions in which they seem to appear, do not follow Paul in this respect. In Aldous Huxley's devastating description of a technological Utopia, he describes the pre-conditioned people of the future, *betas, gammas, deltas,* and the like, all diabolically efficient

automatons. There is nothing of this sort in the Bible; man is not an automaton, and he is exalted above the animals. He has a conscience; he is capable of choice and decision; he is under obligation; he is responsible. He is always *confronted* by the will of God; what is most peculiarly himself is his will. But this obligation always comes to him in a context of revelation and possibility and promise and hope; never as an end in itself. He can be lured by the demands of righteousness, justice, and mercy; he can hear the word of revelation; he can apprehend the inward forces that make for mutuality and communal solidarity; he has an amazing capacity for self-determination and self-transcendence. Above all, he is one who is loved by God; that is how he may conceive his human existence.

The whole discussion of the nature of man has received its most detailed and ample, if not its most illuminating and instructive, treatment in the writings of Karl Barth and Emil Brunner. To Barth, the relation between man and God is one of discontinuity. In the "fall of man," which he understands not historically but rather as a part of *Urgeschichte*, man lost every vestige of the divine image. There is no continuity between primal man and ourselves. So there is no continuity, no point of contact, between God and man. Barth thinks that Christ's work of restoring the divine image to man is an *absolute* miracle. Together with the rest of man's nature, his reason has been totally corrupted. Man's character as a human being (*humanum*) is depraved. Of such extreme language we can only say that it would seem to obviate all theological discussion, and, from the point of view of this paper, would contradict the biblical portrait of man. Barth is obviously reading the whole of Scripture through the eyes of Paul. Even in Paul, however, there are comparatively few passages to which Barth can resort to make his case, and in these passages it may be questioned whether he has read them in their complete context. It is characteristic of Paul to balance his more extreme utterances with others that qualify them and put them in a somewhat different light. The doctrinal passages, for example, must be read not only in their entirety, but also in connection with the ethical exhortations with which the letters usually and significantly close.

It is more difficult to do justice to the position of Brunner. He shows how futile it is to think of the "fall" as history, and he believes that the image of God is not destroyed but is still present in all men. He

might have quoted with approval a late Jewish writing to the effect that "every man is the Adam of his own soul." Brunner also understands the more inward character of man as it is pictured in the Bible: "Man is only man in virtue of the claim made on him by God" (*The Divine Imperative*, p. 66). "The necessity for decision, an obligation which he can never evade, is the distinguishing feature of man" (*Man in Revolt*, p. 98). It can be seen from the foregoing that Brunner makes a "natural" theology possible, and there are many pages in which he shows an understanding and appreciation of liberal theology. Yet these are more than counterbalanced by ideas which ultimately have the same effect upon us as Barth's view of man. John Baillie quotes a sentence from Brunner's *God and Man:* "I teach with Barth that the original image of God is demolished, that the *iustitia originalis* and with it the possibility of doing, or even of willing, what counts before God as good—and so also the freedom of the will is lost" (*The Knowledge of God*, pp. 29 f.). Such a statement is particularly bitter, not so much because of its complete falsity but because of its gross exaggeration. It would seem to undercut all moral incentive and rob moral imperative of any great meaning. "Love your enemies and pray for them that persecute you," says Jesus, "that ye may be sons of your Father who is in Heaven." I believe it is profoundly true that after we have done our best we are still unprofitable servants, that man's sin is very deep and real and terrible, that our trust lies in *sola gratia;* but to see the will of man as so corrupted that he is incapable of any real choice at all seems to me to make the Word of God to us of little effect. God's grace is free, but it is not capricious.

V

The purpose of this paper has been to examine the biblical portrait of man in one of its major aspects. The reason for doing so is that the history of theology has, for the most part, concentrated its attention upon that portrait. But for many men there is an approach to the problem which is not confined to the biblical record. It does not seek to erect an alternative structure so much as to erect a structure which would include the story of man since the close of the canon, our own experience, and the various modern disciplines which bear relevantly on the subject. Into this it is impossible to enter. But what can be said is this: we have all of us ourselves known men and women, perhaps

inconspicuous and undemonstrative persons, who have communicated to us something of goodness and mercy and selflessness, a genuine capacity for self transcendence that approximates the image of God. Some of them might come under the Barthian category of men who have experienced the wonder of a new creation through Christ, but in all reverence and candor, I doubt whether this adequately describes all such persons.

We would also see the persons of Scripture in a perspective somewhat different from Barth's: men rising out of the dark crises of their times and in strange and vivid ways embodying the tragedy of their world. Moses' wrestling with the great imperatives of his destiny, Elijah's urgent haste to return to the demands of history upon him, Amos' mighty protest and sense of divine impulsion, Jeremiah's sensitiveness and conflict—these and many more show us men actually confronted by God, men who, despite their own wishes in the matter, have heard the word, "Son of man, stand upon thy feet!" Or we could turn to the literature of the world which has become classic precisely because it has described to us our own situation so vividly, and we would there encounter a number whose name is legion. When we think of these persons, known and imagined, Karl Barth's descriptions seem exaggerated. Rather, we return to that ancient watcher of the skies into whose ken there swept a new planet:

> When I consider the heavens, the work of thy fingers,
> The moon and the stars which thou hast ordained,
> What is man that thou shouldst remember him,
> And the son of man, that thou shouldst visit him?
> Yet thou hast made him a little lower than God,
> And hast crowned him with glory and honor.

SIN AND SOCIETY

By Herbert W. Schneider
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It is now well known that Adam and Eve were not the original sinners, but merely the typical or representative sinners. The story of their fall is the plot of a common experience in any life; it is not the beginning of history. In general I take the Hebraic-Christian philosophy of history to be not literally an outline of history, but a commentary on human experience and society at any time in history. The state of nature, the fall, the social contract, the covenant of grace, and the last judgment are abstractions from daily life and are historical only in the sense that history is a mixture of them.

1. The state of nature before the fall is the state of innocence. Once lost, innocence is irrecoverable. A cultivated purity or saintliness is not a return to the state of nature; on the contrary, the state of transfiguration or heaven is the end of creation, not its beginning. It is quite the opposite of "a new created world," and no fallen angel can ever fall back into nature. Man is very different from the angels in that his natural state is an animal consciousness without conscience and an animal faith ignorant of God. Professor John Baillie claims that he cannot recover in memory "the virgin soil of childish innocence," and that there never was a time when he was conscious of himself but not of God.[1] Possibly his memory is poor; possibly his memory is itself guilty of childish innocence; possibly he really is an extraordinary person, trailing clouds of glory. Normal men do not even need to turn to memory to discover their childish innocence, but find it abundantly in and about them. We do not begin life with God; God enters from time to time as our capacity to receive revelation grows. We lose our innocence gradually, but seldom completely.

This bliss of ignorance is not harmless; it is conscienceless and may or may not be folly. Adam and Eve, like many of their children, did not even know enough to fear death (let alone to fear God or the serpent), and it was easier for the serpent to tempt them with fruit than for God to threaten them with punishment. Even the heavens

1. *Our Knowledge of God*, p. 4; cited in Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, p. 127, note.

declare the *glory* of God, but the moral *law* is not declared, but is discovered in and through experience. It is true that animals are said to have been commanded by their creator to "be fruitful and multiply." But this is not really a command, and obedience to it is no virtue. In fact, many of the heroic virtues preached by allegedly sophisticated prophets as being beyond good and evil are really before good and evil. Like pride, they come before the fall and reflect an underdeveloped conscience. In short, the garden in which Adam and Eve lived was no park; it was a wilderness in which they were far from secure. The most beguiling animals were serpents, and the most tempting fruits poisonous. Had they remained in the garden, their lives would probably have been, as Hobbes said, "nasty, brutish and short." But they would not have cared, for their eyes had not been opened.

2. The fall, the fruit of desiring to know good and evil, puts an end to this state of nature.[2] When Adam and Eve had eaten the fruit they knew only that they were naked. This is an amazing way for God to reveal Himself in the beginning. The *Uroffenbarung* is simply a revelation of our *Urdummheit*. No man has seen God; God reveals Himself negatively by making us ashamed of ourselves. This disappointing result of the knowledge of good and evil is a commonplace of human experience, but it is difficult to interpret.

The Israelites regarded it as punishment for disobedience to the command of God. The Greeks interpreted it as divine jealously at human pride. The Christians took over both theories. Strictly speaking neither disobedience nor pride is the essence of original sin. Original sin is not an act, nor is the fall literally a fall. The fall is a "state" or consequence of revelation, and sin is really sinfulness or fallibility. The discovery of our nakedness before God produces shame. Similarly God's revelation is neither a law nor a vision, but a question—"Where art thou?" God appears as a judge, but His judgment is not a legal judgment pronouncing guilt, nor a moral judgment condemning pride, but a shaming. He causes Adam and Eve to look *at each*

2. I sometimes think that original sin is the belief that moral knowledge can be achieved by eating. A baby puts anything into its mouth, as if it hoped to gain experience more from indigestion than from observation and manipulation. It is, indeed, a tempting theory that the more intimate sensations are the best, and that by filling our stomachs our eyes will be opened. This folly is truly the beginning of wisdom, but it is a painful beginning.

other in shame and confusion. Their conduct suddenly becomes ridiculous; they hide in bushes, wear fig leaves, and begin blaming each other. Instead of acquiring knowledge of good and evil, they have merely become ashamed of themselves and abusive toward each other. In short, the beginning of knowledge is in the sense of failure, not the sense of values. We do not need the *imago Dei* in order to discover sin. We know we are sinners even though we can not see God's glory. He reveals Himself by condemning us. He does not blame us, He does not impugn our motives; He cursed the serpent, but there is no good evidence that He is wrathful toward men. He simply tells Adam and Eve *where they are:*

> I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception; in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children; thy desire shall be thy husband and he shall rule over thee; cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life; thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of the field; in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return to the ground.

This is the life of any farmer. God is simply telling man where he is and what he may expect, now that his eyes are opened. Though Jews regard this word of God as a punishment for disobedience; though Greeks call it the consequences of pride; I think it is simply a revelation of where we stand. It is the state of nature as it looks to an animal that has seen the truth concerning his natural state.

3. The discovery of man's true state of nature ends the illusion of the garden of paradise and natural providence and leads to labor. Adam and Eve together must make a garden. This society of labor is the product of revelation, the "wages of sin." Man is not a "political animal" by nature but by necessity, and the discovery of this necessity is for most men a bitter and sorrowful experience. A ready-made orchard would naturally be preferred to a field that yields food only after diligent cultivation. The passage from the state of security, where a provident father presides, to the state of co-operative responsibility is the most serious crisis in life, and, like Adam and Eve, their children feel that they are being expelled violently from their home into a cruel world. They attempt to justify it on the ground that labor is a life-long punishment for a general depravity. But this moralized version of the fall is anachronistic; it projects the social system of rewards and punishments back into the state of nature. It is not

necessary that the fall should have an additional penalty; natural sin is its own punishment, even though social virtue be not its own reward.

The sin of Adam and Eve was against God, but they began at once to judge each other. Out of this reciprocal judging among men comes conscience; out of conscience comes law and civil society. The state of society, the moral state, takes the place of the state of nature. Men bind one another by a "social contract" for co-operative labor. They hold one another responsible and thus govern one another. The moral law is a thoroughly human product, and to represent it as the voice of God is an ancient form of pride, an undue glorification of virtue. Law is the fruit, not the origin, of morality, and its purpose is to help men in making a living together. It is indispensable for agriculture, but it is not therefore the gateway to heaven. I cite a typical and familiar glorification of morality by Hawthorne. At the end of his tale, *The Maypole of Merry Mount*, which relates how a band of stern Puritans suppressed an innocent May Day frolic, he writes:

> As the moral gloom of the world overpowers all systematic gayety, even so was their home of wild mirth made desolate amid the sad forest. They returned to it no more. But as their flowery garland was wreathed of the brightest roses that had grown there, so, in the tie that united them, were intertwined all the purest and best of their early joys. They went heavenward, supporting each other along the difficult path which it was their lot to tread, and never wasted one regretful thought on the vanities of Merry Mount.

Adam and Eve had a more sober conception of the "moral gloom" that descended on them. The economic tie that united them in gardening was not the same as the ties of companionship that united them in the Garden of Eden. The society of marriage is more natural than that of labor. "The purest and best of their early joys" were gone, and the couple were not going heavenward but to the dust. The Puritan romanticizing of the social order, presented in this tale by Hawthorne and in more epic form by Milton's hymn to Adam and Eve's "wedded bliss," is based on the Calvinistic idea that the cities of this world ought to be cities of God. The social state on such a theory should be a communion of saints; the moral law should be divine, human institutions should be channels of grace, and social progress should lead straight to the kingdom of heaven. A more accu-

rate and sober picture of our social state is this picture of Adam and Eve bound together in labor, working themselves to death.

Social bonds are not sacred; and crimes are not sin. The distinction is important. Hobbes made the point succinctly when he claimed that David did not sin against Uriah, though he injured him, and quoted David's "against Thee *only* have I sinned!" Sin is not a social relation, but a relation between man and God. God's judgment of man and of his societies is qualitatively different from men's judgment of each other in society. Men approve and disapprove each other cautiously, prudently, by policy, because they hope thereby to work together. Human rewards and punishments are instruments of government. God judges as a critic does, to expose flaws in a performance, or as an expert tests a machine. He does not prescribe; He diagnoses. He does not legislate; He examines. It is a man's virtue in society to be just; it is God's virtue to be all-seeing. Society demands decency, tolerance and respect for privacy; God exposes mercilessly. Moral judgment and God's judgment have totally different aims and methods. The classic description of this contrast is in Job. In the face of "friends" Job can assert his righteousness; in the face of God no man is righteous. The social self-respect of Job is irrelevant before God. To be condemned by fellow men is humiliating; to be condemned by God is humbling.

4. The state of grace is, therefore, not to be confused with social contracts, and the covenant of grace is not a pattern for civil society. It is not a state of justification but of forgiveness. Since the relation between man and God is not a legal relation, the theologies of justification, atonement, and redemption are irrelevant. They project social relations into the relationship between man and God. The basic error of most theologies is to conceive of the relation between man and God as a social relation. Though God speaks to man, it is a different language from that in which man speaks to man, and its categories are those of religious not moral experience. The revealed word of God is neither fatherly counsel nor the command of a sovereign, neither providence nor law. It is the mirror of truth, the opener of eyes. Similarly God's grace is not justifying in a social or legal sense; it is forgiveness in a natural sense. God's grace is simply His sparing some sinners. God is not literally a governor who rewards and punishes. He is more or less tolerant, patient of evil, allowing both tares and wheat to live. God's revelation is absolute, but it has no certain con-

sequences. God's judgment is not pragmatic; it represents no decision and has no predictable consequences. It may or may not lead to penitence or to salvation.

But grace leads indirectly to the formation of a new type of society. After having endured divine judgment and experienced grace, men see themselves and each other in a new light. They become a society of sinners in the state of grace, not in the sense that their society is founded on sin, but in the sense that each is conscious of being judged and spared by God and is, therefore, engaged in self-criticism rather than in reciprocal or social judgment. A communion of sinner-saints is not a co-operative enterprise; it is a brotherhood. Such a fraternity of sinners, like a group of patients in a hospital, or a camp of prisoners of war, is a communion of sympathy rather than a division of labor. It is a church, not a state. Moral men, like the pharisee who was not a sinner and who wrongly imagined he was not like other men, may say their prayers in public and mix their prayers with reflections on their neighbors. They are not in the state of grace, for they hesitate to commune with sinners. And their institutions are not houses of prayer but of the *social* gospel. The sinner, on the other hand, preoccupied with his own sin, is in communion with God and in fellowship with other communicants. But he is not justified, literally. He is comforted and gains a peace which is often hard to distinguish from an easy conscience. He who finds the peace of forgiveness or grace and then interprets it as justification has invented a convenient technique for making his conscience easy—a technique which has brought the church into disrepute among sinners whose consciences are not so easily quieted. In a communion, there is no administration of grace and no attempt to transform divine mercy into moral government. Sin is not a social relation, and the sense of sin must be produced by God, not by human professional justifiers and condemners of others. A preacher is a poor substitute for the voice of God. There is no class-consciousness among convicted sinners and no government. A communion is an uncovenanted society of those who "judge not" because they await God's judgment.

5. The last judgment is a future state. It is difficult for moral men to believe that God should be infinitely patient. Sooner or later He must take action. Pharisees, especially, feel the need of a final act that will vindicate the righteous. It is a temptation to interpret history

as a series of such judgments and to cut the course of grace and damnation to the pattern of human administration of justice. This is the sin of many prophets, a blatant form of pride and a false form of moral science. Being in trouble, men feel the sense of sin and divine judgment; being in a crisis, they must reform their morals. Being prophets, they translate their moral judgments into "Thus saith the Lord" and prepare for the Last Judgment. But so far the Last Judgment is still in the future, and the state of grace continues.

Man has an itch to be able to say, "I told you so!" And few men can contemplate in comfort an indefinite postponement of final vindication. Whether it be pride or love of justice that drives man to this discontent, the fact is that man demands finality. To make this demand of God, to ask Him to be not merely the absolute and omniscient judge that He is by His nature, but to guarantee the human credit of justice by putting His stamp on history is audacious, to say the least. It is faith, no doubt; but whether it is a good and reasonable faith is doubtful. Far be it from me to call it sin, for God has not revealed the inner secret of His will, and it is, at least, possible that there may be an end of history and a final accounting. But apart from faith, if we judge on the basis of experience, we must conclude that God "cometh as a thief in the night," destroying our security when we least expect it and making it increasingly difficult to calculate the end.

The Gesture Language of the Hindu Dance. By Madame La Meri. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. xviii + 100 pp. $10.00.

Mme. La Meri aims to clarify the Hindu drama-dance (*nātya*) to the layman, and her beautiful book is a selective exposition of "hands" (*hasta*) as used by the dancers. In her plates she illustrates thirty-four single (*asaṃyuta*) hands and two hundred combined (*saṃyuta*) hands, which she describes briefly in her text, while she also designates some of their uses (*viniyoga*). Since the Hindu dance is a highly competent means of communicating ideas and relating events, its "language" of bodily movements is complex and proficient. And since, further, the hands are the most mobile part of the body and the chief organ used in the gesture language, the treatment which La Meri gives should indeed do something to illuminate the Hindu dance to a layman, so that he can see its intention to be intellectual as well as graceful and skilled. To increase the clarifying value of her book, she also has brief remarks on the religious background and legendary history of the Hindu dance, with characterization of the "Kathakali, Sadir Nautch, Kathak," and "various other schools," and the "new dance of India," which has flourished partly with the interest of Rabindranath Tagore and the study and exhibitions of Uday Shan-Kar and others. A brief "Foreword" of blessing by Dr. A. K. Coomaraswamy precedes the work, and Dr. Henry R. Zimmer contributes an appreciation of Nāṭya as an Introduction.

It is doubtful that in this book Mme. La Meri can give more than a vague idea of the character of Nāṭya. A reader may discern that it is intellectual, but he will not be equipped to get the full meaning of a performance. The fact is that no one is likely to grasp the content of a classical Hindu drama-dance who has not himself studied the art intensively, perhaps practised it. Even a Hindu, who daily uses many of the gestures illustrated in this book, such as *alapadma,* would have to be educated to the art to be a connoisseur. To understand an exhibition, he needs to study the texts or receive instruction from a master, and doubtless to practise the dancing as well.

At some time, which we may hope will not be too far distant, some industrious scholar with an encyclopedic temperament will have to go to work on a tremendous opus to give us the history of the Nāṭya,

with edition and translation of the pertinent texts, codification of terms, and copious illustrations from the sculptures and practice by current artists. He will show us, as though in a grammar and a lexicon, the units of movement (*hastas* and their modulations, with the movements of the torso, the feet, the head, the face), their association in use (morphology and syntax) to produce the complete work. Certain valuable work exists, as in Coomaraswamy's *Mirror of Gesture*, Naidu, Naidu, and Pantalu's *Tāṇḍava-Lakṣaṇam*, Sāgaranandin's *Nāṭakalakṣaṇaratnakośa* (ed. Dillon), and other works, and this volume by La Meri. Uday Shan-Kar has something of this idea, although his purpose is primarily to collect material which he can use in a practical way. La Meri has gone to some of the available works, but appears to be handicapped by having no use of Sanskrit. But no one person has yet exploited anything like all the materials.

Very striking little points from ancient sources need co-ordination with the great bulk of the material, which is all classical or later. The dancing figures from the third millennium sites in the Indus Valley recall the traditional art. It is worth noting that in the Rig Veda the dancers are Uṣas, the heavenly courtesan (1.92.4; 10.29.2), and Indra, whose dancing is mentioned a number of times, at the moment when creation was in progress and he stirred the dust. In one late hymn (10.72.6) the gods, as though secondary creators, stir the dust, as though in dancing. Uṣas is an excellent prototype of the classical courtesan dancer, and Indra's court is, with Jains, Buddhists, and Hindus alike, a place of the most adept dancing. It would be speculative to say that the art of dancing has been a continuum from the third millennium B.C., but we can feel certainty of the connection between the Vedic allusions and later beliefs.

Until this kind of treatment is provided, we have use, as well as joy, in seeing so charming an index to her own art as Mme. La Meri gives us in these illustrations with her commentary.

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Yoga: Personal Hygiene. By Shri Yogendra. Bombay: The Yoga Institute, 1940. 301 pp., 36 figures. $2.00.

This volume forms part of a series of publications of the Bombay Yoga Institute, which, in 1931, started with a periodical, *Yoga* and, after three years, turned to a sequence of monographs covering the

various aspects and aims of yoga practice with regard to the criticism and experimental research of modern medicine and psychology. The author, well versed in Western medicine, is a pupil of the late Hindu saint and yoga teacher, Yogīśvara Paramahaṁsa Mādhavadāsjī († 1921), who entrusted him with the task of "practical Yoga Renaissance." For this purpose Shri Yogendra founded the Bombay Yoga Institute, toured the United States, and collaborated with various Western scholars, e.g., Dr. C. W. Hack, of the Life Extension Institute, New York (1919-22), Dr. McSutton, New Jersey (1921-22), Dr. Rice, California, Dr. Amsden, Bloomingdale Hospital, and others. The intensive work of his institute, covering decades, offers a remarkable instance for what collaboration of modern research with traditional Hindu wisdom is able to achieve. Among the credentials which the author presents in the present (second) edition of his book on Yoga hygiene and medicine are acknowledgments by the Asthma Research Council of Great Britain, the University Charity Clinic of Berlin (yoga treatment for chronic constipation), and the Médecin-Général of the French Government. Dr. John W. Fox, late of S. B. County Hospital of California, contributed a preface, endorsing the scientific character of the author's methods; moreover, Oglethorpe University had the official publications of the Yoga Institute, including the present volume, microfilmed and sealed in the archives of the "Crypt of Civilization" among the world's selected "most authentic sources of knowledge contained in books" and to be preserved for 6000 years (1940 to 8113).

Yoga doctrine, under the form of archaic Haṭhayoga, since immemorial times, has been the Indian highway of eugenics and macrobiotics. It has its roots in the primitive layers of non-Vedic, pre-Aryan tradition. Aiming at perfect health and command of the body, it is among the main prerequisites for the pursuit of spiritual yoga (Patañjali's yoga, etc.). Its basic notions and exercises having entered practically all kinds of yoga and serving various antagonistic ways towards the realization of the highest truth, the purely medical outlook offered by the present book is by no means negligible for the student of religion. The obsession of bodily cleanliness and acrobatic control of the organism, amounting to systematized narcissism and to a kind of canalised neurosis concentrating on the instrument of one's microcosm, turning the back on life's social and secular tasks, however sterile and

distasteful it might seem to the Western extrovert, should be appreciated by the psychologist and student of religion as a basic feature of Hindu saintliness, and religious and philosophic pursuit.

The two introductory chapters deal with the "Ideals of Yoga Hygiene" and the "Possibilities of Eternal Youth"; the subsequent chapters specialize on the Yoga treatment of various parts and organs of the body; chapter 3, on the "care of the teeth, mouth, tongue, ear and sinuses"; chapter 4, "care of the nose"; chapter 5, of the eye; chapters 6 and 7, of the digestive organs; chapter 8, of the respiratory apparatus; chapter 9, of the sexual organs; chapter 10, of the brain and nervous system; chapter 11, on the skin. The closing chapter deals with hygiene in general.

Throughout the book, details of Yoga hygiene are tested and coordinated with Western research, e.g., the effect of yoga colon flushing (*basti*) is illustrated by X-ray photographs; there is constant and impressive parade of all kinds of Western specialists, quoted and referred to for corroboration of the validity of ancient Yoga teachings before the forum of modern science. The Yoga Institute was founded to prove that Yoga can stand the criticism of modern research and is able to yield valuable contributions to modern therapy. Its publications are meant to do away with an inveterate and all too widespread habit of disparaging Haṭhayoga as a hopeless medley of primitive superstitions grown stale, and perverted sexuality too unsavory to stand detailed description.

In this attempt to restore the reputation of Yoga by harmonizing its teachings with modern medicine, the author has been all too successful; he has offered a somewhat onesided and shortsighted picture of what Haṭhayoga in its esoteric and symbolic layers (Kuṇḍalinī-yoga, vajrolī and khecarī-mudrā, etc.) actually implies. He has paid somewhat dearly for his devoted concentration on contemporary specialized medicine by losing sight of the pictorial symbolism of the microcosm and the archaic representations of introspective experiences which are among the most fascinating, if archaic aspects of Yoga. To compensate for this shortcoming, the student of religion and philosophy, in search of a comprehensive picture of Haṭhayoga and kindred yogas, should turn to the writings by Arthur Avalon (Sir John Woodroffe), the eminent authority on Tantrayoga, to George W. Briggs's rich monograph, *Gorakhnath and the Kanphata Yogis* (New York,

1938), and to other indologists familiar with esoteric Hinduism, such as A. K. Coomaraswamy.

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Amos Studies. Volume I. Parts I, II, and III. By JULIAN MORGENSTERN. Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1941. ix + 428 pp.

This volume is a reprint and separate publication of studies that were published in the *Hebrew Union College Annual* in 1936-38. It contains three studies. Part III is the largest, sixty per cent of the whole, and might well furnish the starting point of the review. Each part is relatively independent. This part is entitled "The Historical Antecedents of Amos," and comprises the history of Israel from David to Amos. It aims to be a survey of the period in the light of most recent results of critical research, with here and there an original contribution, particularly in the voluminous notes, in the field of Old Testament study. It is characterized generally by a cautious reserve toward the biblical tradition, free from hypercritical extremes, aiming to conserve critically all that has historical value; and it reminds one of Alt among modern biblical critics.

At first it produced disappointment that the beginning was not made with Moses. For, since Wellhausen and Stade, there has been a return of Moses, and it is now realized more than formerly that the desert period must not be neglected. But it soon appears that the author is fully conscious of the fundamental contribution of the desert period, and that throughout the discussion it is regarded as the starting point in Hebrew national history. This is commendable and likely to become a most promising and fruitful source for the better understanding of Old Testament history and its contribution to civilization. The reviewer was one of (if not the first) to take this stand among modern critics in his *Old Testament History* (1915) which has since become the prevailing view. It has produced a new type of biblical history, akin to Green's history of England or Wells' history of the world, putting into the foreground social movements and values.

It is substantially this point of view which underlies Morgenstern's restatement of the antecedents of Amos. The desert ideal is the criterion by which later social and religious practices are tested. The simple ideas and ideals of the nomadic or semi-nomadic and mainly pastoral

conditions become, on account of their intrinsic moral values, the standard. Departures are condemned and reformations return to them as the goal. The settlement in Palestine brought with it tendencies to depart from the desert standards and to substitute for them Canaanite customs in which sacred prostitution, drunkenness and debauch, and disregard of the rights of the common man predominated. But the desert ideal never lacked its champions, who came from the prophets and the descendants of the Rechabites and Kenites among whom Moses had his soul set afire at Horeb, the mountain of God. Again and again, Morgenstern points out, these champions recalled the Israelites to nobler ideals, instituted reforms and embodied them in revised codes of laws. This new view of the origin of Old Testament social and religious ideals is now well on its way to become predominant. It was first broached in an unpretentious college Bible study textbook on Old Testament history, based on a first-hand study of the biblical text, which has enjoyed a wide circulation. It was followed up by J. W. Flight's "The Nomadic Idea and Ideal in the Old Testament," in the *Journal of Biblical Literature and Exegesis* (1923); then more fully by C. C. McCowan's *The Genesis of the Social Gospel* (1929); and has now found its way into the recent publications on the origin of the Hebrews. And while the world is in a life and death struggle for democracy, it is well to remember the contributions the Hebrew prophets have made to the democratic ideal. It is Morgenstern's high credit that his *Amos Studies* will contribute much to this end.

The reviewer cannot follow the author in his higher estimate of Elijah at the expense of Elisha. The biblical tradition in the story of the theophany at Horeb makes Elijah responsible for the bloody program which Elisha follows, as interpreted in his *Old Testament History*. The same tradition gives other instances of Elijah's use of the sword to institute religious reforms, and Hosea's higher point of view in condemnation of these bloody acts is reiterated against Elijah by the Prophet of Nazareth (Luke 9:51 ff.).

The second part of the *Studies*, occupying ten percent, deals with "The Date of Amos' Prophecy." If you can follow the author and accept his conclusions, the result is a dramatic scene of striking effect. On a New Year's Day, when the high priest enters the most holy place of the Temple to offer incense, at Bethel just the same as at Jerusalem,

and when the Temple courts are crowded with expectant worshippers who have come to see the sun (or the "Glory") rise and enter into the most holy place (it being the autumnal equinox), the voice of Amos startled them with his opening message of doom. He gives his message on this single occasion and is driven back to his native Judea by his opponent, Amaziah, the priest of the sanctuary at Bethel.

If such an event actually occurred, it appears strange that it should have disappeared from history to be recovered by a long and involved series of inferences. Such an historical fact would never have been forgotten; it would stand out at least as clearly as David's dance before the ark when he brought it home. These inferences imply a confusion of the two Jereboams; the New Year's Day with the Day of Atonement; the exact occurrence of an earthquake; the discovery of a case of leprosy (which is a germ disease transmitted by contagion, involving slow development) brought on at an exact moment; the identification of an unknown Judean prophet with Amos. These are by no means the only difficulties. The offering of incense among the Isrealites in pre-exilic times has been seriously questioned since Wellhausen. The present status of the problem is not such as to justify the use made of it to support the thesis (see Max Loehr, *Das Raeucheropfer im Alten Testament*. Halle, 1927). The whole process of the argument, ingenious indeed, fails to produce conviction. It is the artificial blending of colors to produce a desired effect; and it does justice to the author as an artist rather than as exegete or historian. Fortunately it does not matter; for it does not affect vitally Amos' character or mission.

It is in Part 1 of the *Studies*, occupying thirty percent, under the title, "The Biographical Sections of the Book of Amos," where they appear at their best in text criticism and exegesis, irrespective as to whether they belong to a particular dramatic scene or not. They consist of a rearrangement of the material that relates to the prophetic call of Amos and his first messages. This material has been transmitted in the present book of Amos in a rather scattered form, and the rearrangement is justified by bringing order out of chaos.

It has long been felt, and was so taken by the reviewer in his *Old Testament History*, that Amos' interview with Amaziah the priest, the classical illustration of the contrast between the priestly and prophetic type of religious leadership, furnishes the most appropriate

occasion for considering together what Amos had to say in prose and poetic form of his call to his prophetic mission. Morgenstern's arrangement of the text, with extraneous elements omitted, is a fine contribution to clearness. It brings out the psychological urge back of Amos' public appearance. It reveals the force of the prophet's convictions. It is likened to a lion's roar at his back that prompts his utterance. Equal praise must be given to the treatment of the Visions. They now appear in their logical sequence as probably the earliest of his prophetic mission; and in such position round out the biographical parts.

Volume One has put us into the proper mood to look forward with eager expectation to Volume Two.

Ismar J. Peritz

Wolcott, New York

Modern Philosophies of Judaism. A Study of Recent Jewish Philosophies of Religion. By Jacob B. Agus. New York: Behrman's Jewish Book House, 1941. xii + 388 pp. $3.00.

With the exception of Adolph Lichtigfeld's *Philosophy and Revelation in the Work of Contemporary Jewish Thinkers,* which was published in England several years ago and was not widely circulated in this country, Dr. Agus' book is the first attempt at a comprehensive and critical, but popular presentation of the ideas of recent Jewish thinkers. Lichtigfeld covered many more people than does Agus, but his presentation was much more sketchy and less fully rounded than that of Agus.

As background for a discussion of the philosophy of Judaism in the work of Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, and Mordecai M. Kaplan, our author presents a group of mid-nineteenth century thinkers. These men were all products of the era of enlightenment; they were trained in the thought of their time, as well as in the traditions of the Jewish faith. The problem which they had to solve was no longer exclusively the problem of the inner consistency of their philosophies of Judaism; it had become the problem of developing philosophies of Judaism consonant with the Jewish tradition and consistent with the general philosophy of religion to which they gave their adherence.

Thus, the views of Abraham Geiger, based on an attempt to syn-

thesize the religious philosophies of Hegel and Schleiermacher, found the origin of religion in the individual in a spiritual tension between the desire for Godlike perfection (Hegel) and a humiliating sense of finiteness and dependence (Schleiermacher). An attitude of the spirit, rather than either a theology or a system of ethics, was central in Geiger's view of religion. The apologetic problem of proving the value of Judaism had to be undertaken by Geiger within this general hypothesis of the nature of religion, had to involve proof of the primacy and centrality of the attitude of spiritual tension, and, at the same time, not to minimize either the theological tradition of Judaism, expressed in the classic terms of creation, revelation, and redemption, or the ethical tradition characteristically associated with Jewish theology. Needless to say, Geiger's resolution of the problem was not overly successful. It consisted of an emphasis on revelation, sanctioned, however, not so much by divine authority as by human reason.

Solomon Ludwig Steinheim took as his problem the delimitation of the boundaries between human reason and revelation. His approach is founded on Kant's discussion of the limits of pure reason; but he breaks with the "intuitionism" of Kant's practical reason. For the moral metaphysics of Kant, he offers Divine revelation as a substitute. It is through revelation, through knowledge breaking in from the extra-phenomenal world, that we derive the answers to those questions which pure reason is driven to ask, but to which it is incapable of providing answers. Thus for the Kantian reduction of the ethical life to conformity with a formalistic sense of obligation, Steinheim is able to substitute a view of Judaism which envisions the ethical life as the devoted service of a free man to his Free God. Steinheim, however, fell short of his intentions when he attempted to define the process by which revelation authenticates itself to the mind of the believer. His solution is that the testimony of revelation will be accepted by the whole man as contrasted with man's reason. This assertion that faith cannot be the result of reasoned conviction is a solution in terms of intuition at a point preferred by Steinheim to the point proposed by Kant.

Samuel Hirsch used the language of Hegel to arrive at a typically Jewish point of view. He declared that the religious experience is a self-identification with the Absolute. The Absolute is free, because unconstrained by any outside force. Therefore, the main content of

both the religious consciousness and the religious experience is freedom. Hirsch breaks with Hegel in his interpretation of freedom; where, to Hegel, God and nature were one, to Hirsch, God and man are one; where, to Hegel, God is free because He is true to the laws of His own being, and man is free to the extent that he accepts the Will of God as his own will, to Hirsch, both man and God are free because they are capable of making a choice between alternatives. This freedom of man Hirsch interpreted in an ethical sense; to be free is to turn one's life into an instrument of the spiritual life. So Hirsch, too, ends with the argument from which he broke away, simply reaffirming at a different point in the analysis Hegel's statement that man is free to the extent that he accepts the Will of God.

Solomon Formstecher was a follower of Schelling in viewing the world as a living organism, in which every element fulfils a definite function. God he sees, however, as both in the world and outside of it. The phenomena of nature are a part only of the infinite attributes of God; they are the part accessible to human comprehension. Man, too, is both in the world and outside of it; while conscious of himself merely as living, he is part of nature, but with the development of the ethical consciousness, man partakes of the realm of the spirit. This possession of the ideal of the Good cannot come to man through nature; it can only be due to a revelation from God. He maintains that if the ideal of Good is taken as central, it is possible to evolve a philosophy of life in which the natural impulses of man and his spiritual ideals are harmonized. The teachings of Judaism incorporate such a philosophy.

These samples of the background of present-day philosophy of Jewish religion serve to indicate both the nature of the problem of the Jewish thinker of the enlightenment contemplating religion and the direction of the solution. The problem, simply stated, was to make religion, and, specifically, the Jewish religion, philosophically respectable, without resigning the essentially irrational character of religious belief. The solution lay in the adaptation of the general philosophies of the day by the development of their ethical facets and by the postulation for man of a somewhat more elevated status in the universe. If there is point to the author's inclusion of this material, the same general tendencies should be visible in the thought of the men to whom the major part of this book is devoted.

The philosophy of Hermann Cohen is analyzed in terms of his concepts of man, of God, and of the relation of man to God. This analysis is preceded by a statement of Cohen's general philosophical position, largely concerned with the development of logic, ethics, and aesthetics, from the three pure directions of culture consciousness, pure thought, pure will, and pure feeling. The relations of Cohen's thought to that of Kant are explored, and Cohen's position in the Neo-Kantian movement is defined. It is made evident that, since Cohen accepts the Kantian axiom that whatever reality may be in itself, it cannot be for us other than what our forms of thinking will permit it to be, both his ethics and his aesthetics must ultimately be dependent upon his logic; that there is a common core of reason in the three directions of culture consciousness; and, finally, that this common core is to be found in the categories from Source to Object whence the concept of Being is produced.

Logis, ethics, and aesthetics must each start with characteristic Ideas, and apply the categories of thought to their respective forms of Being. The process in each case starts from analogous, rather than identical, points. The starting point of Cohen's ethics derives from jurisprudence, a science standing in the same relation to ethics as mathematics to logic. This starting point is an incipient tendency of the will to weld a many into a one, as for example, in the juridical concept of a corporation. How this is analogous to the derivative of calculus, which is the starting point of logic, is not clear, since Cohen does not state the formal requirements of analogy. Essentially, this is due to the fact that, for Cohen, the use of analogy is broadened to mean that just as we seek for the starting point of reason in reason itself, so we must seek the starting point of ethics in the ethical consciousness. "Cohen is thus faced with a fundamental paradox. Ethics is a 'pure' direction of spirit, though, clearly, it is founded on a feeling of certainty that is not rational in origin" (p. 75).

The parallelism between Cohen's logic and ethics is clearer in terms of Object than in terms of Source, for where thought ends in the concept of the universe as one organism, will ends in the concept of human society as one organism. Cohen's concept of man, that is, the goal toward which men ought to strive, is the concept of a group of persons acting as a unity. In essence it amounts to this, that the supreme end of ethics is the ideal society of mankind. Thus, to Cohen,

the individual is important from an ethical point of view only in so far as he contributes to the evolution of the ideal society. There is a vague sense of the individual which arises from the distinction of persons necessary in legal action; however, religion rather than ethics is the realm of the individual. Once more, as in Hegel and in Samuel Hirsch, we meet in Cohen the characteristic limitation of freedom, "individual freedom of action exists only to the extent that the individual identifies himself with the cause of humanity" (p. 81). Thus, Cohen modifies Kant's "practical reason" into "pure will" and transfers the ground of the "Ought" from the sphere of individual action to that of the destiny of mankind. He fails, however, to answer the question of the relationship of empirical will to pure will, or, in another form, the question how the actions of man, which are largely determined by mechanical causes, tend to the realization of the ethical ideal.

The concept of God in Cohen's system represents the tying together of the actual world, which is the Object of thought and the actuality of the ideal society, which is the Object of will; basically, the function of God is to assure the maintenance of the physical world for the ethical goal. There is, however, a secondary stratum in which God is not simply this logical concept of harmony, but is, rather, a Power transcending both man and nature. This provides the basis for Cohen's view of the relation between God and man. Religion arose in mythology, and became religion when, in the Hebrew prophets, the function of God became that of aiding the efforts of man to discriminate between right and wrong. Since this was the Source of Religion, we must look elsewhere for its Object; this Cohen finds, in his earlier work, in the development of ethics: the sole purpose of religion is to help men to live an ethical life; with the slow development of culture consciousness, ethics gradually dispenses with the aid of religion and stands forth as an independent science. In his later works, however, religion achieves a grander position as the unified culture consciousness of every age; while religion does not produce new knowledge, it focuses attention on new relationships; it draws fresh meaning from the concepts of logic, aesthetics, and ethics.

This summary is presented here to draw the attention of the reader to the systematic character of Cohen's thought, and to the secondary position occupied by religion in the philosophic views of Cohen. But

behind and beyond these philosophic views, particularly as he grew older, Cohen felt a resurgence of faith, and made an attempt to incorporate into this system a justification of religion in general and, in particular, a presentation of the Jewish religion as most religion because furthest away from mythology. Essentially, for Cohen, there are two Gods, the objective God of philosophy, and the subjective God of religion. In the final analysis, Cohen's personal religion, rooted in feeling, emerges triumphant over Cohen's philosophy. "The 'religion of reason' is despite its jealous 'purity' and complex dialectics, religion as well as reason" (p. 123).

Agus' presentation of the philosophy of Cohen is by far the most thorough and competent in the book, even as Cohen is the most adequate of the philosophers presented. Those weaknesses in Cohen's views of religion which have been noted inhere in the post-Kantian tradition. Where epistemology is central and the dominant approach is rational, the scope of religion must necessarily be limited, and the limitations must necessarily increase as reason conquers more and more of the areas of human concern. Only by the development of a theory of human religion, without divine sanction or divine revelation, can there be an expansion of the boundaries of religion within the framework of post-Kantian thought. The most successful example of such a theory of religion, that developed by Felix Adler, is excluded from this book, "since Adler saw no value in Judaism" (p. 325, n. 1), a comment which neither Adler's work nor the course of the religious society he founded would justify.

Franz Rosenzweig, though in some respects a disciple of Cohen, is actually a representative of the mystical approach to the consideration of religion. Agus says:

> It were unfair and quite unrewarding to study the works of our author as if they were merely the reasoned analysis and systematization of objectively known facts. We should then be viewing the message of this original philosopher from a standpoint which the entire tendency of his thought aims to repudiate. His works are to be read, as the expression of a real religious experience, as the actual records of the progress of a great and pious soul, in the course of its grappling with the ultimate mysteries of the Universe (p. 131).

Rosenzweig's philosophy is centered in the experience of divine revelation, which was denied by Cohen. The content of this revelation is

limited; it is the assurance of God's love for man, to which man can respond only by love for others. To develop a philosophy, Rosenzweig is forced to conceive of the relationship between beings as more significant than the abstract relationships of ideas. He maintains, therefore, that "speaking," or, better, earnest conversation, is more fundamental than thought, and that, in fact, ordinary logic is itself derivable from true speech. The necessity for this novel development arises within the Kantian tradition; thought within that tradition denies the objective reality of time, and Rosenzweig believes that God, the world, and man are united by a process which does not deny the reality of time. In speech, he finds such a process. He analyzes all meaning into three primary words, "yes," "no," and "and," whose essential significances are affirmation, denial, and relationship.

The essential relation between God and the world is creation; between God and man, it is revelation. Creation represents the past tense, revelation the present. Essentially redemption is the future tense; it is God's love for man as responded to by man's love for the world. Every deed of love performed by men is directed to the world as a whole in anticipation of the organic unity of the world in the Kingdom of Heaven. Every recipient of true love becomes eternal; to be eternal means to be a part of the redeemed world as it is envisioned by God.

Rosenzweig's specific views of religion center in the questions of the historicity of revelation and the nature and efficacy of prayer. Prayer is a method which man employs to make himself a better channel for the love of God; it is, in addition, a method of hastening redemption. Revelation is neither subjective nor transitory. It is an event leaving objective traces which endure eternally. The authenticity of revelation is established by a standard of content and a standard of effect. The Bible fulfils both standards; it is, therefore, revealed. Both Israel and the Christian community, which are based upon the Bible, are divinely ordained religious communities, and together constitute the stage of being which brings eternity into time and God into the world. As far as Judaism is concerned, he concentrates on two questions, "What is Judaism as a living faith?" and "What does it mean to become a Jew?" The first question is answered in terms of the Chosen People doctrine; the believing Jew approaches God through the medium of his people. The second question is answered in terms of a religious experience; the Jew experiences religion by reliving the past of his

people; to become a Jew means, therefore, to feel one's unity with the Jewish people.

This view of the Jewish religion led Rosenzweig to a position closely approximating that of the extreme orthodox; the difference lies in the fact that the details of the Law must be proved divine by their effects; "the proof of the authoritativeness of any law in Judaism is, therefore, the extent to which that law serves today to awaken the religious consciousness" (p. 207).

There is some kinship between the thought of Rosenzweig and that of Hegel; but it is of more importance to point out that Rosenzweig's work represents a falling away from the strict rationality of Cohen's; this tendency toward anti-intellectualism, neo-mysticism, is especially marked, among recent Jewish thinkers, in Martin Buber. The central theme of Buber's work is that true life can only be found by entering into personal relations with the environment. Buber was deeply influenced by the Chassidic movement, because it seemed to him to be a characteristic product of the Jewish spirit bearing out his central intuition. Religion, in his most mature presentation, involves the substitution of a dialogue relationship, an "I-Thou" attitude, for the instrumental relationship, the "I-it" attitude, which is characteristic of both common sense and physical science. The characteristics of the "I-Thou" relation are defined as wholeness, exclusiveness, presentness, centrality, freedom, directness, non-orderability, and love. The product of the relation is revelation:

> When a person has once reached the height of entering into relation with the eternal Thou, God, the creative energy that he brings back with him from the meeting is termed revelation (p. 244).

Man, however, does not bring back from this meeting the absolute resolution of all conflict; there are two antinomies brought back which man must resolve through his life. The first concerns man's relation to God; God comprises man's self, yet the self remains distinct. The second antinomy is that of destiny and freedom.

Much of this is mere psychologizing; Buber attempts to analyze his own subjective experiences, but assumes his basic intuition, also subjective, as the accepted, as the point of departure for his analysis. Thus we cannot judge his analysis in any terms except its own. Agus' search for analogues is completely unnecessary. There is no need to examine, as Agus suggests,

the "Thou" relation not as a subjective experience of Buber, but as an objective description of a form of consciousness, which now and then displaces the normal or common-sense consciousness of men (p. 262).

What is important is to understand Buber's religious views in their own terms and with their own intellectual limitations, and to envision the practical results of this religion. Such a summary is given by Agus:

> We are to regard whatever situation we are placed in as the starting point of an endeavor. The situation will itself reveal to us what our task is. Knowing our task, our acts constitute the reply of ourselves to the call of God. By these acts, we become real, and help God to create the world. . . . Evil exists, to be sure, but only as a problem and as a task. The perception of evil is a challenge to us—a challenge which we are to meet with our deeds. The reward of those who heed the call is the knowledge of being real, of being in harmony with the will of God which comes to them thru his creation. Those who live for themselves alone are to be pitied since, like the opium-eater, they live in an unreal world of their own. He alone truly lives who knows his own self to be but the one pole of his being and who feels the ties of devotion, which, like the magnetic lines of force, stream from him to men and nature and thence to the other pole, God. To be religious is to be actual, is to live in perpetual conversation with God—a conversation which coming from God to us is expressed in the needs of the situation as it is understood by man in flashes of mystical insight and which, returning from us to God, is concretized in the form of deeds performed to meet those needs (pp. 268-69).

This may be for some a satisfactory religion; for them Buber is of value, whether or not his experience has been duplicated in the history of mysticism.

As for the practical significance of such a view of religion, it is obvious that it must issue in an ethics of action, in which the individual conscience is central. While Agus conceives the reinstatement of personality involved as a healthy reaction against the tendency to degrade human personality which is common to sociology and psychoanalysis, he feels that Buber's attitude, because it is beyond the reach of argument is itself dangerous. "If God be not defined by any rational attribute, then is devotion to Him a snare, more than a beacon of light" (p. 276). "The idea of a God of love is capable of invigorating an ethical life, but not of replacing reason as a guide to the good life" (p. 278). This, it seems to me, is an index of the limitations of Agus to at least as significant a degree as it is a criticism of Buber. Is not the search for rational attributes of God a refined and subtle form of anthropomorphism?

It is when Agus, with his desires for rationality, comes to the presentation of Reconstructionism, the philosophy of Mordecai M. Kaplan, that his treatment reaches its nadir. For Kaplan is guilty of the cardinal sin of being a pragmatist. Kaplan's essential doctrine is that religion is a group affair; those ceremonies sanctioned by the tradition of the group should, therefore, be maintained as a cohesive force. They should, however, be re-interpreted in the light of modern science and social science. This falls, and Kaplan with it, in the opinion of Agus, because, by virtue of this conception, Kaplan sees God as a power outside of man which works for the realization of human ideals. Agus claims that this is too indefinite; that Kaplan's Reconstructionism lacks what is for him the "one test which no real religion can afford to fail, and that is the requirement that its conception of God should be sufficiently precise to refer to a definite entity" (p. 312). This, again, is a departure from strictest impartiality in the direction of Agus' preconceptions. Actually, there are excellent religions with no God, and this reviewer pointed out, several years ago, in discussing Kaplan's *The Meaning of God in Modern Jewish Religion*, that the retention of God in Kaplan's system is purely formal. Kaplan is, in fact, the last term to date in a movement to socialize religion. He is a religionist at the extreme opposite pole from mysticism. Thus, religion is a group, not an individual affair, it is essentially healthy-minded, and religious experience is not of the transcendent but of the here and now. It is a form of religion which can be well received within the Anglo-American culture complex, because it is fundamentally based in the Anglo-American philosophical and social tradition.

The book concludes with a summary statement of "the Common Core of Modern Jewish Philosophy," and with Agus' theses toward his own philosophy of religion. The common core of the basically dissimilar views of these four thinkers Agus finds in their rejection of materialistic and humanistic criteria for ethical valuation. "An essential part of ethical experience is the feeling that there is an outside source to our judgments of right and wrong, that the stamp of validity attaches to our apprehensions of the rightness and wrongness of things" (p. 330).

Thus, we see that the four greatest and most typical exponents of recent Jewish thought agree in basing religion upon the perception of ethical values. Though they represent widely differing philosophical movements, these thinkers agree that, at bottom, religion and ethics are one and that

the voice of conscience is somehow also the voice of God. In this belief, modern Jewish philosophers continue to cultivate the original insight of their ancestral faith (p. 335).

As for the author's original theses, it should suffice to say that, while they amply document his philosophical prepositions, they supply proof that never will Agus himself be considered worthy of treatment in a book like his own.

As the best work that has been done, *Modern Philosophies of Judaism* should be read; let us hope that one of its readers will be impelled to a more careful consideration of the same material, and a better book produced. When that occurs, it is to be hoped that both style and proofreading will be improved.

JOSEPH L. BLAU

New York City

John Hus and the Czech Reform. By MATTHEW SPINKA. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1941. 82 pp. $1.50.

The scope and limits of this book are indicated partly by its title, partly by a short preface. The author set himself the task of comparing the ideas of John Hus with the doctrine of John Wyclif and of ascertaining to what extent the Czech Reformer had been indebted to his English forerunner. The book is neither a comprehensive biography, nor an exhaustive analysis of John Hus's teaching. It is a critical examination of one of the most important and attractive problems concerning the activities of John Hus and the origin of the Reform Movement in Bohemia.

Those familiar with the subject will promptly perceive the value of this monograph. It is a new contribution to a controversy concerning the dependence of John Hus upon Wyclif's writings. Inaugurated by an Austrian scholar, John Loserth, almost sixty years ago, this controversy overshadowed other aspects of the early Czech Reform and deflected the progress of research from its original course. Loserth maintained that some of the writings of John Hus entirely, and others for the greater part, are the exclusive property of Wyclif, and that there is no ground for speaking of a Hussite system of doctrine. His assertion was both provocative and inaccurate. However, it stimulated other scholars, especially Czech historians, and gave rise to a copious literature concerning the point at issue. Loserth's theory had been tinged with racial and religious prejudices and reflected the tense at-

mosphere prevailing in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in the late nineteenth century. It prompted its opponents to the adoption of a polemical tone. Many of their contributions, though intended as dispassionate studies, have taken the form of apology and failed to convince the neutrals.

Dr. Spinka entered upon this field with both a remarkable knowledge of the critical literature and linguistic equipment. He has confronted the views of the Austrian scholar with the conclusions reached by Czech historians who partly corrected, partly supplemented Loserth's interpretation of the problem. A large number of monographs, of critical editions of Hus's writings, of articles in periodicals, written mostly in Czech, have been available to the author of the book under review. He based his verdict on a scrutiny of the conflicting views. A good knowledge of conditions in the orbit of the Roman Church during the late Middle Ages, combined with deep insight into the intricacies of public life in Bohemia about 1400, protected the author against hasty conclusions or generalization. Written in the tolerant American atmosphere, the book lacks verve, abundant in controversial monographs of Austrian and Czech authors, but recommends itself by balanced judgment and accuracy. It is a sound and valuable contribution to Bohemian church history, a vade mecum for those who would find it difficult to consult modern biographies of John Hus in Czech.

Two aspects of the subject serve as the foci of the book: the relation of Hus to his reformist predecessors and contemporaries, especially to Wyclif, and the elucidation of the true character of Hus's doctrine. The study has been divided into three parts. The first chapter gives an introduction to the problem; the second has been devoted to the analysis of Loserth's method, which consisted mainly in mechanical confrontation of passages from Wyclif with Hus's writings and paid surprisingly little attention to practices of medieval scholars, whose wont it had been to corroborate their own views by extensive quotations from famous authors. That chapter contains also a summary of detailed studies by Czech historians who, while admitting the connection between Wyclif and Hus, pointed out the domestic sources of the latter's zeal for Reform. The two currents of thought, the criticism of the medieval Church by eminent Czech preachers (Milic *et al.*) and thinkers (e.g., Matthias de Janov) of the late fourteenth century, as well as the vehement attacks on the Papacy by the English Reformer, equally inspired John Hus in his life and literary activities. In his cam-

paign against abuses, the desire of his Czech forerunner to bring about a radical change of the existing system culminated. It would have, however, hardly attained impetuosity and revolutionary character if its champions, John Hus and his adherents, had not added to the domestic pattern Wyclif's postulates and claims. In the final chapter, dealing with the trial at the Council of Constance, the author examines carefully the charges against Hus, based, as they were, on a perfunctory study of the latter's writings and on depositions of witnesses from the rank of his domestic opponents. The author confronts the accusations with the Reformer's defense, supplementing the latter's argument with conclusions drawn from a new analysis of the disputed points.

The book gives answers to many questions which occupied modern biographers of John Hus. It establishes his position between medieval moralists and reformers of the sixteenth century. The author maintains that it would be an error to regard Hus merely as a medieval scholastic. "There are two sides to him, which could be loosely designated as Catholic and Protestant, as was the case with Augustine. There were elements implicit in Hus's teaching which the Reformation made explicit." This conclusion, though presented in general terms, indicates that John Hus was a true son of his age, which had been characterized by an opposition to the centralistic tendencies of the Papacy, but bore all marks of a period of transition from one epoch to another. Medieval components of Hus's doctrine seem to have preponderance, if only his Latin works are consulted and not enough attention is given to his dynamic personality and his zeal for reform. The author rightly points out the heroic example and moral earnestness of the Reformer. They constituted his most potent influence upon his contemporaries and accounted for the inner strength and modernity of the Hussite movement.

Otakar Odložilík

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Marlowe's Tamburlaine: A Study in Renaissance Moral Philosophy. By Roy W. Battenhouse. Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1941.

The importance of religion for what, to a superficial eye, seems the merely secular literature of the age of Shakespeare has been increasingly recognized by scholars. A romantic and belletristic criticism

during the last century too seldom explored the spiritual depths beneath the sunlit surface of Elizabethan poetry and drama. Our own more nervous and disillusioned age has found a new kinship with the inner struggles cloaked by the contemporaries of Shakespeare in such gorgeous images. We now perceive the tragic disturbance evoked by the ethics of Machiavelli as akin to our own disturbance at no less challenging ideas and their accompanying actualities. The threat to idealism in Elizabethan times almost equals that of our own times. Outwardly cheerful writers, such as Sir Philip Sidney and Edmund Spenser, knew strange visitations of despair. Dramatists, such as Webster, Chapman and Tourneur, explored the night of the soul, gravely debating whether in their own dark times the stars themselves still shone. Even the outwardly more contained playwrights, like Shakespeare and Marlowe, faced a threatening universe shaken by recent earthquakes in religion and faith.

In *Marlowe's Tamburlaine,* Roy W. Battenhouse discusses the famous play which, with justified enthusiasm, he describes as the first great English drama. The sub-title of the book, *A Study in Renaissance Moral Philosophy,* indicates his serious purpose. Throughout the sixteenth century, morals were still, of course, largely a religious issue. Thus an unscrupulous dictator, threatening the world with conquest and slavery, became a threat also to religion. He is seen as irreligious because he loves earth rather than eternity. In his conquests the pious eye detects the scourge of God sent against corrupt peoples. The dictator himself is represented as immoral in his cruelty, as proud to a degree of mad impiety and atheism, and as ultimately defeated by sickness and death. That he "makes a bad end" is in itself enough to vindicate God's vengeance on earth, even though his life is a series of almost unbroken triumphs. Though he seem great, greater by far is God's Providence. Pride carries its own punishment.

Such is the interpretation given to Marlowe's play in this critical essay. The book deserves attention both because it is able work and because its faults are no less grave and conspicuous than they are commonly to be found in literary discussion. It is held that the playwright and audience alike saw the drama in this severe light. To prove his contention, the critic reviews the typical Protestant reaction in France and England to materialistic philosophy and Machiavellian ethics. Emphasis is given to the new type of Neoplatonic idealism best

exemplified in Philip Mornay and Sir Philip Sidney. The first half of the volume deals with the general background of Renaissance ethics and religion, barely mentioning Marlowe's play. It affords an able if highly cursory review of its large subject. Especially welcome are chapters on the thought of Sir Walter Raleigh and George Chapman. The author attempts to trace the differences between Renaissance idealism and scholastic doctrine.

The second half of the book deals with Marlowe's *Tamburlaine* as seen in the light of the times already painted. There are chapters on the highly moralized type of history dramatized by the poet, on his own additional moral emphasis, and on his debt to Spenser, Seneca, Machiavelli, Huarte, Charron, and others. Chapters on Marlowe's physiology and psychology lean heavily, but not unduly, on research by Carroll Camden and Lily B. Campbell.

Mr. Battenhouse concludes that Tamburlaine is presented throughout as a thorough villain, and that the entire drama is focused upon a strictly conservative moral outlook. The old Humanist, Marlowe, is robbed of whatever reputation he may ever have had of being a rebel, and made rather like such a New Humanist as Mr. Allen Tate. The last sentence of the book sums up with becoming emphasis: "Certainly these ten acts of *Tamburlaine* offer one of the most grandly moral spectacles in the whole realm of English drama."

The case is strongly urged; the thesis sustained with learning and emphasis, if not with subtlety. No Elizabethan play has received a more thorough study from the standpoint of its moral philosophy. Since Mr. Battenhouse is a young scholar and a new-comer in this field, it can hardly be inappropriate to express delight in the ease with which he steers his very considerable reading to logical account in his argument. There may, however, be grave doubts as to the impartiality and sufficiency of his conclusions. Little or nothing which he says will be found false. But, long as his book is (and it is three times the length of *Tamburlaine*), it has not said enough. It does only partial justice to Marlowe's moral philosophy and gives a very biased view of Marlowe's play.

The central issue is an old and ultimately insolvable one. Too many perplexing questions lie behind. The basic problem raised by the thought of *Tamburlaine* is clearly identical with that raised by Marlowe's *Doctor Faustus*. It is not enough to note that the branch is

cut. We must note also that it "might have grown full straight." How far does conventional moralizing ever express our actual thoughts and, more especially, our actual feelings? How far does the true artist write direct moral propaganda? If it is thought by some that Milton was "really" on the side of Satan, how much more is Marlowe on the side of his Tamburlaine, his Mortimer, or his Faustus? Is it true that every man loves a lover; and is it still more true that every man—secretly or openly—admires the ideal of conquest? Did certain Elizabethan intellectuals really hate Machiavelli more than they admired him? In an age dangerous to heretics, how far did heresy actually go? How far can a work of art mean one thing to a large group of readers or spectators and another thing to a small group? Was the Elizabethan audience all of one mind? How far can a work have different meanings to its own author at different times? Boccaccio's view of the *Decameron* supplies a not irrelevant instance in considering the last of these questions. The critic who is, at times, accused by his opponents of sophistry, may in truth only be trying as hard as he can to keep abreast of the infinite sophistry of the human heart and mind.

The present book deals seriously with none of these more devious matters. Assuming that thought moves in straight lines, its author neatly and even blandly shuts his eyes to all curves. Hence the universe which he describes is, unhappily, not our universe at all, nor is it *Tamburlaine* nor any other work of art, but merely a limited series of moral disputations.

The author rightly makes much of the agreement in thought between Marlowe and George Chapman, the scholar-poet who completed that brilliant poem, *Hero and Leander*, left unfinished by the younger man. However, he quite overlooks the probability that in the man Tamburlaine Chapman would certainly have felt, even though he might not have cared to acknowledge, the presence of the type of the supremely talented but unhappily passionate man symbolized by Homer in that image of all *virtú*, Achilles. No, Elizabethans darkly loved as well as truly hated their villains; and this riddle the present author, making life and art much simpler and clearer than they really are, prosaically and conveniently overlooks. Almost any Elizabethan was likely to find himself, at one time or another, in the moralizing mood which Mr. Battenhouse so well describes. Almost any Elizabethan, for better or for worse, was even more likely—espe-

cially in the theatre—to find himself captivated by the satanic seductions of the half-mythical Asiatic conqueror of Marlowe's vision. Inconveniently for the critic's theory, it is known that Marlowe was not a good boy in school nor a good man thereafter. The oldest English Morality Play is given by its critics the title, *The Pride of Life*. Tamburlaine embodies this pride. His quality is found to be in varying degrees evil by the moralists. And undeniably the poets are moralists. But, enthralled by his own well-documented argument, Mr. Battenhouse seems almost wholly to have forgotten that they are first of all poets, and therefore elusive. And so, in this sense, are we all. Accordingly, a more thoughtful and even a more learned study of *Tamburlaine* still remains to be written. Meanwhile, of the many able studies which we now possess that by Mr. Battenhouse is by all odds the best.

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Diderot's Treatment of the Christian Religion in the Encyclopédie. By J. E. BARKER. New York: King's Crown Press, 1941. 143 pp. $2.00.

Students of the eighteenth century have in general been reluctant to stress Diderot's contributions to the *Encyclopédie* as a basis for any discussion of his ideas. The reasons for this reluctance are obvious. It is difficult to determine which of the unsigned articles in the work are Diderot's, and, even in the group safely attributable to him, it is difficult to determine which ones he has written for the sole purpose of appeasing those in authority. Since the ideas expressed in the *Encyclopédie* are often at variance with those in his other works, it has been assumed that the more outspoken, uncensored ideas of the latter are a truer expression of the man than the hesitating, sometimes contradictory, censored ideas of the *Encyclopédie*.

In his discussion of Diderot's treatment of the Christian religion in the *Encyclopédie*, Dr. Barker has been fully aware of these difficulties and has done much to obviate them. Selecting some three hundred articles from that work, he has analyzed with considerable care the ideas expressed therein. He has examined the equivalents of these articles in Chambers' *Cyclopaedia*, the *Dictionnaire de Trévoux*, and other similar compendiums. He has often compared the ideas contained in these articles with views upon similar subjects expressed by Diderot in other uncensored works, and where he has

found divergence between the ideas of the censored articles and those of the uncensored works he has sought to give reasons for the contradiction.

Dr. Barker's very clear, methodical analysis of these three hundred articles presents an interesting picture of Diderot's ideas upon theology. Taken together, they offer a curious mixture of orthodoxy and unorthodoxy, sly innuendoes, sharp exclamations of irritation, and a rather complete statement of a natural religion. All of this, to be sure, is what one would expect from the pen of Diderot, with the exception of the orthodoxy which occurs in about a third of the group.

This orthodox treatment of the Christian religion is so frequent and so unexpected on the part of Diderot that Dr. Barker has felt the need to give some explanation for it. For this phenomenon he suggests two reasons, the first of which has often been proffered by students of the eighteenth century. Diderot, under the pressure of the censorship, found it expedient to present the orthodox view if he wished to publish his *Encyclopédie* in France. The second reason, however, is more original. Mr. Barker suggests that Diderot was merely following the stated policy of the encyclopedists in presenting the state of knowledge concerning theology up to date. An obvious objection to this explanation lies in the fact that, if Diderot was following this fixed policy in regard to orthodox theology, he was singularly negligent in ignoring the state of knowledge concerning heterodox theology. That he knew these works on heterodoxy is incontestable, but with the exception of the small *Traité de la liberté*, he carefully refrains in the *Encyclopédie* from showing any acquaintance with them.

This assumption that it was a combination of censorship and policy which gave such a surprising tone of conformity in these articles loses some of its significance when a simple but highly important fact discovered by Dr. Barker is considered. Before discussing Diderot's treatment of the Christian religion in these articles, Dr. Barker was forced to distinguish, at least for his own guidance, between Diderot's treatment and that of others whom he used extensively. It is a well-known fact that the *Encyclopédie* utilized pertinent material wherever it could be found. Dr. Barker's study of Diderot's sources, though exploratory, gives an interesting example of encyclopedic pilfering. He found that ninety-five of these articles could be traced wholly or in part to Chambers; twenty-five, to the *Dictionnaire de Trévoux;* thirty-one, to Calmet's *Dictionnaire de la Bible;* some eighteen, to

Broucker's *Historia critica philosophiae;* not to mention occasional passages here and there drawn from the writings of Bossuet, Buffier, Turrettini, and many others (p. 24). Only eight of the articles were extracted from Bayle's *Dictionnaire historique et critique.* Since the *Encyclopédie* was destined to be a compilation of the then known theological thought, Diderot compiled that thought rather lavishly from very reputable sources indeed. It was probably these sources which are responsible for the strong note of orthodoxy.

If the material compiled from others were separated from Diderot's material in the articles, we would get a more consistent picture of Diderot's treatment. Dr. Barker has preferred not to make this separation of material, except in a small number of the articles which he discusses. For the most part, he takes the full article as an expression of Diderot's views. I think that this leads to some confusion in the total picture and really raises issues which could be easily settled by a more rigorous method of examination.

If Diderot's treatment of the Christian religion still remains somewhat unclear, the treatment accorded the Christian religion in these three hundred articles has been carefully and methodically detailed by Dr. Barker. Here the arrangement of his material is clear and full, and his conclusions are helpful and important. He classifies the articles in four groups: those wholly or almost wholly orthodox; those partly orthodox and partly skeptical; those distinctly hostile to the Christian religion; and lastly, those which present Diderot's own constructive views on natural morality. He concludes that the Church was right in regarding the *Encyclopédie* as an enemy, and believes that their censorship was rather efficacious in enforcing some semblance of orthodoxy. His work is a neat little contribution to the reopening of studies in the field of the *Encyclopédie.*

Ira O. Wade

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Nietzsches etiska åskådning i dess relation till kristendomens ethos. By Bertil Kristensson. Stockholm: Svenska kyrkans diakonistyrelses bokförlag, 1940. 191 pp., Bibliography. Kr. 5.

The University of Lund's prodigious theological activity has produced yet another volume on the relation of Christianity to non-Christian thought. Its main object is neither systematic formulation nor general apologetics, but scientific investigation into historic con-

texts of meaning. Anders Nygren, who is the great original thinker of the Lundensian school, holds that the task of the theologian is the clarification of the historic context of meaning which is Christianity. This context has a regulative pattern or determinative norm, *agape,* in the light of which what is truly Christian within the history of "Christian" thought can be judged, and in the perspective of which all non-Christian thought can be distinguished. Several volumes on the former topic have already appeared, and we are likely to see many more like the one reviewed that deal with the latter field of investigation.

Dr. Kristensson presents a competent and stimulating study. Whatever shortcomings there are, are almost entirely those due to his method. He has summarized Nietzsche's essential teachings in a clear, concise, and significant manner. His citations are unusually full and cumulatively convincing, even for a Swedish thesis for the doctorate. The general structure of the book is simple, strong, and clear. He treats Nietzsche's basic teachings in the first chapter, Nietzsche's idea of Christianity in the second, and his misunderstanding and faulty treatment of Christianity in the third. Dr. Kristensson has mastered Nygren's point of view, method, and spirit almost to the point that the reviewer could predict with nearly complete certainty what observations and criticisms would be made in the third chapter. He has a sensitive feeling for motifs, and, for those who can read Swedish, the reviewer suggests this book as a good starter to see how illuminating, stimulating, and generally fruitful this method is.

When all this has been said, however, it must be admitted that complete discipleship is somewhat discouraging to those who may be convinced that not even such an able and genuinely thorough scholar as Nygren may have arrived at the final truth in method. When Dr. Kristensson, for instance, manages to fit all of Nietzsche's writings into the motif of aristocratic individualism, the reader is likely to wonder if the material has not been somewhat accommodated to the method. After all, can a purely formal analysis of Nietzsche's works during his three basic periods: the metaphysical-ethical, the theoretical-critical, and the prophetic, do justice to the staggering riches of this fountainhead of ideas? Are there no conflicting *basic* motifs within a soul so struggling and despairing, so full of empathy and creativity, as Nietzsche's? Can Nietzsche, even the thinker, be adequately dealt

with except against the background of his own personal drives, experiences, and circumstances? The reviewer's knowledge of this powerful personality and thinker is naturally meager, in comparison with that of one who has spent years in analyzing all of his works in detail. But relying on what he knows, he can, at least, register a definite hesitancy as to the full adequacy of the purely formal method, at least in this case, and wish for a more genetic-empirical investigation along with this excellent motif study.

Why is Dr. Kristensson not more frank, moreover, about the unfortunate theologies which have been called Christian and yet failed so thoroughly to be consistent with the main motif of *agape?* Nietzsche had ample grounds for much that he said about Christian theology. The reviewer's thoughtful reading of this volume further convinced him how definitely similar to a basic Christianity Nietzsche was in much of his rejection of a small-minded and weak-hearted "Christianity." The book does not bring out the strength of Nietzsche's insights, even from a Christian perspective, and fails to acknowledge the historic reasons for Nietzsche's criticism of far from Christian traditionalisms.

Nietzsche's writings have two basic aspects: the prophetic and the theoretical. The theoretical is basically negative. It sets out to destroy metaphysics and moralism, especially as they are based on supernaturalism. The prophetic drive, on the other hand, is deeply religious. The prophet must destroy the actual to make room for the creation of the ideal, the individual aristocrat who is full of spontaneity, autonomy, and pride in contrast to the herd man, who in fearful humility accepts external authority. The theoretical reason must negate knowledge in order to free life for spontaneous creativity. Instinctive life must replace moral, rational metaphysics. *Amor fati* and eternal repetition must supplant God and teleological history. Commonplace will-to-live must find zest and struggle in the will-to-power. Man must not remain on his present level. He does so because he is bound down by the herd. He decays through fears of the crowd no more than through sympathy with it, which makes him dependent on the weak and common. The strong man must know the dimension of distance free from dependence on the herd, free to become truly his highest creative self.

Man must be freed from the actual. Nietzsche hates and loathes the

actual. This is his deep religious experience. He must be free from it, from all actual authority that holds him back, whether external as of the State, or internal as, for instance, of the desire for praise. The strong, aristocratic individual is self-sufficient. He is proud. His love is the overflow of inner strength. His teaching is wisdom bubbling over. Even his suffering delivers the strong from thralldom to happiness, and he meets it with power as part of the creativity of life.

Christianity Nietzsche hates as metaphysics, as supernatural superstition, as a thralldom of the masses under a life-repressing morality, as demeaning egalitarianism, as reactionary passivity, as the extolling of the weak, as the will to die, most fully seen by the central symbol of the Cross, as sterility of true life and reality, as external authoritarianism, as shameful obeisance, as coarse eudaemonism.

Kristensson meets Nietzsche's criticisms of Christianity by saying that individualism is a false perspective inapplicable to essential Christianity. Its perspective is ever relational. There can be no question in Christianity about an isolated individual, but only about what kind of relation is best in a given fellowship. Nietzsche's ethics, therefore, has a categorial content which is basically distinct from Christianity and cannot be rationally compared with it. It is easy, furthermore, to show that *agape* is by nature not only capable of, but in fact demands, unlimited creativity; that its acquiesces in no leveling equalitarianism but exists only as a free fellowship, without envy and pride, demanding that the fellowship be completely concerned with each individual as he actually is, and that each member contribute according to his actual maximum capacity; that Christian ethics is not heterodox in the sense of imposed external authority, but is the free acceptance, based on insight, of God's will as ethically valid and ideal; and, finally, that Christian *agape* in attitude and perspective is the very opposite of eudaemonism.

The book is immensely stimulating, but also definitely challenges the Lundensian abandonment of metaphysics for the sake of its purely formal method. Its method, too, makes somewhat thin and unrealistic the profuse and vivid thinking of a great personality. Why, too, when the study of Nietzsche in relation to Christianity is so timely and significant, was not the socio-political problem treated at all? Will the Lundensians continue to avoid this burning question? Perhaps we need

a few more Nietzsches to remind us that Christian theory and application are travelling widely divergent roads.

NELS F. S. FERRÉ

Andover Newton Theological School

Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism. By CHARLES HARTSHORNE. Chicago: Willett, Clark & Co., 1941. xxi + 359 pp. $3.00.

This is an ambitious and important work. It is the second in what is to be a series of three volumes, the first of which, *Beyond Humanism,* appeared in 1937. The third, we are informed, is to be entitled, *The Universal Orthodoxy.* The author's purpose in the book under review is "to show that and how the question, Is there a God? can be answered by secular or philosophic reason operating according to strict canons of procedure." His final conclusion is that "secular knowledge supports the religious idea of God if, and only if, by religion is meant something distinct from, and partly incompatible with, what has passed as orthodox theology." It is maintained that "religious people have held philosophically justifiable beliefs about God thanks rather to their religious superiority than to their philosophical skill." The author finds a richer and truer intellectual content implicit in the religious faith that God is love than in Thomism, Spinozism, German idealism, or positivism. He suggests that Christianity be judged in its own terms, "not in terms of its borrowed Greek garments." With his definition of God he claims to be able to demonstrate the Divine existence with "logical rigor."

Before stating Professor Hartshorne's theses more explicitly, I must call attention to some of his definitions. A being is absolutely perfect in so far as it is not conceivably surpassable, even by itself. A being is relatively perfect in so far as it is not conceivably surpassable by any other being, though surpassable by itself. A being is imperfect in so far as it is surpassable by some other conceivable being. With these definitions it is pointed out that of the following propositions *one, and only one,* must be true: (I) There is a being absolutely perfect in all respects. (II) There is no being absolutely perfect in all respects, but there is a being absolutely perfect in some respects. (III) There is no being absolutely perfect in any respect. View I is represented by absolutism, Thomism, and most European theology before 1880;

view II is represented by much contemporary Protestant theology, while view III is represented by atheism, some forms of polytheism, and the doctrine of a merely finite God. "This division is exclusive and exhaustive. To prove any two of [the three] propositions false is to establish the truth of the remaining proposition."

View I, it is claimed, cannot be proved, and it is less favorable to religion than some form of view II, for the reason that a being absolutely perfect in all respects (A) could not possibly be served by man. On the other hand, some form of view II might be found philosophically defensible or even demonstrable—such a view for instance, as would posit a being absolutely perfect ethically but only relatively perfect aesthetically, and consequently a being which could be both worshiped, as perfect, and served, progressively satisfied, by man's obedience and co-operation. But view II covers three different possibilities: the God of that view might be absolutely perfect in some respects and relatively perfect in all other respects (AR); or absolutely perfect in some respects, relatively perfect in some respects, and imperfect in some respects (ARI); or absolutely perfect in some respects and imperfect in all other respects (AI). The view Dr. Hartshorne is concerned to defend is the one symbolically represented by AR, namely the theory that God is absolutely or statistically perfect, unsurpassable even by himself, in *some* respects, such for instance as moral goodness, while in some other respects his perfection may be thought of as relative and dynamic, surpassable by himself. For example, God's knowledge of the free acts of man may grow as they pass from future to present, and his satisfaction in man may grow as man progresses toward the divine ideal for him, even though in these and all other dynamic perfections God may be thought of as unsurpassable by any other being.

The third general view, that God, if he exists, is not absolutely perfect in any respect, but is surpassable in all respects, either by himself or by some other conceivable being, may be entertained in any one of three forms: either that there is a being which is in all respects relatively perfect, surpassable only by itself (R); or that there is a being relatively perfect in some respects, and imperfect, conceivably surpassable by some other, in all other respects (RI); or that there is no being which is not imperfect in every respect, i.e., surpassable at all points, conceivably, by some other (I). This last position would

be atheism. ARI, AI, R, and RI denote different varieties of the concept of a "finite" God.

It might be expected that, with his expressed preference for AR as being more in accord with the needs of religion than A, Dr. Hartshorne would reject the traditional ontological argument and rely primarily upon religious experience, not only for his idea of God but for assurance of the existence of God as well. But this is not the case. A thing as conceived, it is pointed out, may be (1) impossible, in which case it is necessarily non-existent; or (2) possible, but not actually exemplified in existence; or (3) possible and actually existent. Theism of type A is rejected as impossible, because involving such self-contradictions as action without resistance, necessary knowledge of contingent events, and love unaffected by the fortunes of the beloved. Theism of type AR, the view defended in Hartshorne's ontological argument, not having been proved to be impossible, is, *if* conceivably possible (as it seems to be), necessarily actual—so, at least, it is argued by Hartshorne—on the principle, apparently, that if a perfect being could be, it would be. But much depends upon whether "could be" means "could actually be" or only "could conceivably be." What we seem entitled to say is that we do not know that a perfect being of type AR cannot conceivably be, and so we may believe that it can actually be; furthermore, since we are not estopped from believing that if there could actually be a perfect being, there would be such a being, we may go on adding belief to belief and believe (if we can) that there is a perfect being (of type AR). But adding apparently permissible belief to apparently permissible belief is *not* (at least according to old-fashioned logic) logical demonstration.

In spite, then, of Hartshorne's claim to evade the dilemma with which Kant confronted the ontological argument, namely, that if it is an analytic argument it commits the fallacy of petitio principii, and that if it is intended as a synthetic judgment it is a case of non sequitur, it seems pretty clear that he does not really avoid it. As the argument is stated in the text, it is as follows:

> If the phrase "necessary being" has a meaning, then what it means exists necessarily, and if it exists necessarily, then, *a fortiori*, it exists. . . . The argument consists in showing that "mere possibility" is meaningless with respect to God, and the inference is indeed analytic; but its premise is that God is not impossible, which—since God cannot be merely possible—

leaves, as the only case analytically allowed, that he is actual. . . . The status of non-actualized potency of existence, that is, contingency, contradicts the predicate of deity.

What does this amount to but to say that if necessary being is at all, it is necessarily? But it remains to ask whether "necessary being" is at all, whether all being may not be contingent—so far as we *know*. This is not to deny that there is necessary being; it is simply to contend that just because it exists *if* it *is* necessary, that is, if it exists necessarily, we are not therefore entitled to infer that it does exist necessarily, or even that it exists at all. The fallacy is never eliminated; it is simply driven from one hiding place to another. The hiding places are ambiguities of meaning, equivocations; now it is the ambiguity of "being" (existence or mere logical being), again it is the ambiguity of "possibility" (epistemological or metaphysical), and again it is equivocation as to the meaning of "necessity" (whether hypothetical, merely logical, or categorical and ontological). If the fallacy of "four terms" is driven from cover, the oscillation between "begging the question" and a plain non sequitur becomes evident. Dr. Hartshorne attaches great importance to logic in connection with metaphysical theism, and especially to "modern logic"; but while we are prepared to admit that the latter has rightly called attention to other forms of valid reasoning besides the syllogistic, we should not like to think that this is to be used as an excuse for representing as *demonstration* a course of thought which turns out to be inescapably fallacious when translated into the syllogistic form.

Dr. Hartshorne appeals to religion as supporting theism of the second type (AR), as opposed to the type (A) represented by absolutism and Thomism. In this I think he is right; but since he has thus appealed to religious experience and faith, there is the more reason to say, to religion let him go. He refers repeatedly to empirical theology, but on the whole with a measure of disapproval which seems to rest in part upon a failure to distinguish sufficiently the various meanings and methods which may be and have been associated with that very general term. Speaking for myself, I would agree with Dr. Hartshorne that one cannot prove the existence of God, *as perfect*, "by examining the details of experience in the manner of the inductive sciences"; that no mere induction can reach the logically *necessary* aspect of God, and that neither the "pure empiricism" which would

hold to the exclusive validity of induction, nor the "pure rationalism" which would confine theology to deduction from self-evident propositions is adequate, but that, on the contrary, we need to use both methods. But while there is thus a considerable basis for agreement between us, and while I am glad to see that he admits that it is from empirical theology, supplemented by empirical science in general, rather than from a priori reasoning, that we must get the details of our knowledge of God, it remains a fact that Hartshorne's method is the more rationalistic, while I place more emphasis than he does, probably, on the fundamental place of the empirical approach for religious *knowledge*, as also upon religious intuition and faith, perhaps, for the convictions the rational permissibility of which may be examined in a final metaphysical theology. As I conceive of a valid theology, it is divided into three principal parts, or stages: empirical theology, setting forth as knowledge what can be discovered about a divinely functioning reality through religious experience; normative theology, a critical *Dogmatik* of Christian or some other historical or contemporary faith; and metaphysical theology, a reasonable synthesis of empirical religious knowledge and religiously essential faith with our further pertinent knowledge and with the implications of critically established values. From this point of view metaphysical theology is no purely a priori discipline, and I cannot agree that it is only by reasoning deductively from general categories, and not at all inductively from particulars that we can make out anything concerning the existence of God. Much depends here upon how specific is the definition of God. If God be defined simply in general terms as a reality functioning divinely in human life on condition of a certain discoverable religious adjustment, it may be found possible to demonstrate empirically, after the manner of the descriptive sciences, the existence of God as thus broadly defined.

Dr. Hartshorne's conception of God shows that he has been deeply influenced by his Harvard teachers, Professors Whitehead and Hocking. His Whiteheadian doctrine of "cosmic organism," with the world as God's body, is suggestive, and a welcome antidote to the onesided emphasis upon the divine transcendence in certain quarters today. However, the author's "panentheism" inclines too much toward pantheism to permit any satisfactory solution of the problem of evil. A God who "includes all" and "always loves everything" seems

scarcely so worshipful or so trustworthy as the ethically absolutely perfect being of whom the author spoke in interpreting his chosen "second-type theism." Furthermore, not a few will hesitate to follow Hartshorne in his subscription to panpsychism. Even if, as philosophical theists, they may seem to themselves to discern the traces of rational intelligence in the general form and direction of cosmic process, they will want to know why they should hold that all process always has been and still is mental in nature. Samuel Butler's view, to the effect that many processes in the cosmic organism are analogous to habits consciously formed but unconsciously followed, will seem a preferable and more obvious interpretation to some.

But in spite of any or all objections, doubts, and shades of difference in opinion, it will be generally agreed, I feel sure, that Professor Hartshorne has given us an exceptionally penetrating, stimulating, and instructive treatise in the field of theological metaphysics.

Douglas Clyde Macintosh

Yale University

What Can We Believe? By Randolph Crump Miller. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941. iv + 240 pp. $2.00.

This book is, first of all, a presentation of Christian apologetics of great value. It is also a well rounded statement of liberal theology modified by some consideration of the claims of what is called "Neo-Orthodoxy," and by critical common sense in the face of recent events. It is also in part a reinterpretation, eclectic in the best sense of the word, of the empirical method in the philosophy of religion. Only one chapter, the chapter on the Bible, can be said to be a mere popularization of ideas familiar in theological circles. The remainder of the book bears the marks of the author's distinctive thought and experience.

As a writer of apologetics, Professor Miller is well prepared. He is saturated with the results of modern thought that is influenced by both science and philosophy, but he has an intimate contact with tradition and especially with the Bible. He has had several years as a student pastor in one of the most secular university centers in America, and has also served as minister in a small church, where he has come to know more typical examples of the lay mind. He is himself less credulous in temper than most official teachers of the Church and is able to make

contact with the scepticism of his contemporaries. Their problems are for him real problems. Also, his method of thought is favorable to this kind of writing because he emphasizes very strongly the idea that we must admit degrees of certainty in our beliefs. Thus he is able to lead the reader on from convictions that have the surest empirical foundation to beliefs which depend upon inference, or upon the less publicly coercive judgments of faith. It should be pointed out that we have here but one type of apologetic writing. There is another type which challenges the reader with the total range of Christian faith as something very different from his usual assumptions, and which the reader may come to accept because his usual assumptions have already lost their real hold upon him and now he is caught by the impressiveness and the *difference* of another whole system of life and thought. In spite of the rationalism of Catholicism, it is probable that Catholic apologetics really have that effect when they are successful. More obviously any apologetics for classical Protestantism must be of that type. Men are brought low enough to accept the Christian revelation because it cuts across their present assumptions. The choice between these two methods in their extreme forms depends entirely upon one's conception of Christianity, but there are various mediating positions, to one of which this book belongs, which may be judged in terms of the pedagogical situation within which they are applied. Professor Miller's method seems to me to be the best in most such situations in America, though I shall raise questions at a later point concerning its self-sufficiency.

As a restatement of liberal theology, also, this book has great value. If critics of liberalism desire to avoid the common practice of tilting with a straw man, it would be useful to take this book as an example of a form of liberalism that is not unable to absorb many of the most important criticisms without a complete change of center. The individualism, contemporaneousness, the anthropocentrism, the moralism, the naïve optimism which the critics of liberalism most often attack are overcome in large measure. God is thought of as both personal sovereign and loving father. God is active in history in judgment and in healing. One of the most helpful chapters in the book is the one on prayer. There is a residue of moralism in the sentence: "God does forgive those who love their neighbors." But this is transcended in the discussion of the parable of the Prodigal

Son (pp. 136-38). The teachings and personality of Jesus are emphasized, but these are put into the context of a divine work. The chapter on Christology is close to recent English modernist discussions of the subject, especially to that in C. J. Cadoux's *Case for Evangelical Modernism*. The Trinity is thought of as a Trinity of revelation, as referring to "three aspects of a single Being." The Church is understood in Protestant terms, with the denial that there is any one valid conception of the Church (p. 122), with sharp criticism of the existing Church, but with emphasis upon the Christian community as an essential aspect of the faith itself (pp. 114-20). The author has felt the impact of the ecumenical movement. His ideas about missions and the World Church follow closely those of Henry P. Van Dusen's *For the Healing of the Nations*. In one place, his criticism of the Church seems to me to be unfair. In order to suggest the lack of unity, he includes in his list of the types of Churches such sects as Jehovah's Witnesses, "angels" of Father Divine, and Christian Science.

The doctrine of man, as here presented, is well balanced. More than the other chapters, it shows the influence of the thought of such theologians as Reinhold Niebuhr. For example, the author says, referring to Niebuhr, "Man's sin is not that he is limited, for God limited him, but in that he refuses to accept his limitation." The discussion of man is carried further in the chapter on society where the author shows his strong sense of the Christian's social responsibility, his radical criticism of existing society, his social hope, and his freedom from a false utopianism. The parts of the book that deal with man and salvation and with social ethics are too brief and sketchy, even in relation to the scale of this book. A final chapter gathers together the insights of the book and provides a competent and balanced answer to the question: What is Christianity? The following sentences express well the spirit of the book: "Theology must be relevant to the experiences of daily living, or Christianity will become an archeological specimen. We must always remember that *justification does not come by belief, but by faith, i.e., by the absolute commitment of the total self to the God revealed by Jesus Christ*" (p. 182).

I have said that this book should be considered as a contribution to the literature of empirical theology. The author owes a great deal to both H. N. Wieman and D. C. Macintosh, and recognizes some

affinity with Bernard Meland and Harold Bosley. His thought is closest to that of his teacher, D. C. Macintosh. He differs from Wieman in accepting the centrality of the Bible and the Christian tradition, in his belief in the personality of God, and in his emphasis upon a superstructure of inferences and analogies. He differs from Macintosh in refusing to claim that his method is scientific, though he seems to accept without criticism Macintosh's idea of the dependability of "right religious adjustment" and the theological laws which he develops in relation to that (p. 49). Both he and Macintosh should give more attention to the obstacles to right religious adjustment and to the many degrees of the "dark night of the soul" which often upset confidence in these "laws of theology."

At the end of the book there is an appendix, which deals in a more technical manner with this problem of method. Here Professor Miller discusses the testing of beliefs and the relation between empirical theology and the superstructure of inference and analogy. I think that he should distinguish more sharply the use of symbols and myths that make more vivid to the mind what is believed on an empirical basis, and the use of analogies that give content to the results of inferences which carry us beyond empiricism. Also, I suggest that such an inference as the belief in the personality of God plays such a large part in the total structure of the thought of the book that without it the book would never have been written. Yet, the discussion of method does not give enough place to such inferences. I have said that this method is a useful basis for apologetics. I believe that such is the case when we are dealing with people whose deepest—though perhaps unrecognized—assumptions are Christian, but the convincing power of this method depends upon implicit faith in the values that are central to Christianity. As we move from strict empiricism to the faith in the fatherhood and sovereignty of God, I suspect that we have little more, in fact, than the spelling out of a faith that is present at the beginning and which provides the religious content for the empirical thought itself. This is a weakness of all presentations of empirical theology and of the rationalistic arguments for God, as well. They depend for their convincing power on a prior faith. Professor Miller comes nearer to a recognition of this fact than his fellow empiricists, but he is too much under the spell of the method to do full justice to it.

It should be said that this book is written in a clear and vigorous

style which combines dignity with popular appeal. Doubtless the author will develop at greater length his own theological conceptions. In the immediate situation he could hardly have written a better book for thoughtful laymen who are repelled by closed systems of thought, and who have as a starting point the Christian scale of values.

JOHN C. BENNETT

Pacific School of Religion

A Creed for Free Men. By WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941. xiv + 277 pp. $2.50.

A Creed for Free Men records a systematic search for a unifying faith with which the human individual may meet the current situation, which is replete not only with intellectual problems, but with conflicting loyalties. The author seeks a statement of faith which "in the appalling tragedy which the world faces today," may help men to "achieve security, maintain courage, keep hope alive and find inner peace."

Roughly, the first half of the book is devoted to the elaboration of the problems and uncertainties with which the contemporary individual is beset. In these pages, Dr. Brown shows himself to be a liberal in his social philosophy. He has a vital and expanding conception of the meaning of democracy as a going form of social administration, and as a system of constructive attitudes toward every individual human being. In his proposals regarding the function of the state, he has departed sharply from the traditional American "police theory." He recognizes the responsibility of government for engaging actively in the organization of the means to a better life for all. His attitude on racial minorities, labor, and social service agencies stamps his social outlook as definitely progressive. In the area of international politics, Dr. Brown puts himself without reservation on the side of those who believe that some co-operative organization among the nations of the world gives the only promise of surcease from wars which threaten all the gains of many centuries.

The last half of Dr. Brown's book presents his positive development of the position that the solution to the many baffling problems of our times lies in the acceptance of the Christian faith. Democracy alone, he contends, is not enough. In his opinion, no system of values and no intellectual sanctions which are to be found entirely within

human experience could be adequate for serving this need. There must be some transcendental source and guarantee of values, if the human individual is to find the leading and the resolution to live vigorously and in possession of inner certainty and peace.

A point at which exception might be taken to Dr. Brown's analysis is with regard to his conception of democracy, which he brings in, rather incidentally, in presenting practicable alternatives which Christians might accept with respect to the support of war. He says (p. 111), "Finally, they may conclude that since neither authority alone nor freedom alone can permanently achieve a unified society, it is necessary to combine faith in an absolute standard of truth and goodness with acceptance of the fact that in a changing world the ideal set by such a standard can only be approximately realized. In other words, they may adopt the democratic attitude toward life." This conception of democracy as a compromise,—as acceptance of an acknowledged second best—is in the reviewer's mind altogether indefensible. Democratic values and attitudes are either good in their own right, in fact the best we can conceive, or they are nothing. To possess a brotherly attitude toward another human being is an original, underived datum of experience. It needs no support from any transcendental order. It can gain no authority from such sanction if it is not actively present in an individual's consciousness.

The relationship of human choice to a transcendental reality—or God—becomes the main point of difference between those whose ethical outlook demands the sanctions of Absolute Goodness and those who find sufficient sanction for good conduct in constructive human experience. The matter of specific choice, which Dr. Brown says involves compromise, exhibits the weakness of the entire transcendental position. The naturalist would insist that every human decision is made with reference to the demands of human experience. He would stand up to his thesis that the aloofness and absoluteness of the transcendental description of the good must be given up, if human choice is to have any dignity and worth.

To accept Dr. Brown's position almost inevitably leads to the following alternatives: either the goodness of God is too high for human beings, who in relationship of worship or of formal acknowledgment beat their breasts over their ethical failures, while in their everyday concerns they follow a much more comfortable system of ethical de-

mands; or every human choice which is made in good conscience is identified with God's will and takes on all the prestige and sanction of the absolute or divine.

It is in the second alternative just given that the gravest danger to ethical sincerity and sensitivity inherent in any transcendental system is to be found. Men may all too easily accept their own plans and purposes at a given time and place as divinely sanctioned, absolute, and eternal, and hold out against changes of circumstance to maintain a situation which is no longer justifiable or, perhaps, has never been justifiable, but which serves their individual selfish ends.

The resolution of this philosophical conflict is of supreme importance for the ethical health of persons and peoples, and for the possible social helpfulness of the Christian religion. The whole story of social inertia, of the resistance of vested interests to imperative social change, of the hardness of heart of those who enjoy advantaged positions in society, of the contempt of the more powerful race for the less powerful, of the bitter rivalry of one nation against another—all these grow out of the transfiguration of particular value judgments originating in the concrete circumstances of life into absolute, God-sanctioned verities. In this way, the institution of human slavery was made to receive God's blessing for those who profited by it. On such a basis, the godly capitalist may think of his ethically insensitive treatment of his workers as having the approval of the Divine. In the very same fashion, nations may perpetuate injustices and continue ruthless territorial and commercial aggression in undisturbed complacency, and with full faith that they are doing God's will.

To the reviewer, it was a matter of satisfaction to note that, in spite of his divergence as a naturalist on practically all theoretical positions from the viewpoint of Dr. Brown, there remained a broad area of agreement with regard to the values and attitudes which are possessed by the ethically sensitive man in our generation. Individuals may differ in their theology or lack of theology, in their attitudes toward modern science and in their fundamental philosophical positions, but they may arrive at substantially identical ethical judgments as they face the conflicting contemporary scene. In this, there seem to be grounds for belief that, in spite of the wide gap which separates men of good will today in their intellectual formulas, there remains the possibility of

comradeship in the pursuit of those loyalties which are the glory of the free man in a democracy.

EDWARD H. REISNER

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Faith and Nurture. By H. SHELTON SMITH. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941. xii + 208 pp. $2.00.

This book is given chiefly to a drastic criticism of what the author considers to be "the central assumptions and concepts of liberal Christion nurture." His thesis is that the theological assumptions of progressive religious education are essentially those of the liberal Protestantism of the latter half of the nineteenth century, which reached their full formulation before the last World War. The development of the main concepts of "liberal Protestantism," he reviews and criticizes in the opening chapter. In most of the succeeding chapters, he seeks to show the ways in which progressive or liberal religious education follows what are to him the outmoded thought forms of liberalism.

While the book shows that the author has done a prodigious amount of reading and has a wide knowledge of the literature of liberal Protestantism and of modern religious education, he has, in his critique, used chiefly the writings of George Albert Coe, whom he correctly recognizes as the pioneer and dean of modern religious education, but he refers also to the writings of other significant leaders, such as William C. Bower. He criticizes modern religious education because he thinks it has an anthropocentric instead of a theocentric conception of God and of the Kingdom of God, a sentimental belief in the goodness and possibilities of man, and a social estimate of man's worth, rather than an emphasis upon his value in the sight of God. He feels, also, that it fails to make Jesus Christ and his redemptive work normative and ultimate, and puts too much trust in human initiative and responsibility and in the possibilities of human reason and of man-made educational processes for personal and social salvation. While indicating that care must be taken not to lose the legitimate gains of liberalism in reacting from an excessive other-worldliness and in making religion relevant to the human scene, and while insisting that man's part in the redemptive process and in the contribution

of religion to human life must be recognized, he asserts as central in religious education what sounds like the characteristic beliefs of orthodoxy, even though he insists that they represent "newer currents of religious thought." As he refuses to be identified with Barthian theology, and as he does very little in elucidating how his orthodoxy is new, there is no adequate basis for understanding what he means by these positive affirmations. An exception to this generalization should be made in regard to his philosophy of the Church, which he sets forth clearly and at some length in what is the best chapter of the book.

In the closing chapter Dr. Smith offers a critique of an "Experimentalist" democratic philosophy, as represented by John Dewey and others. He holds that the world view of Experimentalism has its origin within the processes of human experience, and therefore is in direct contrast with the Hebrew-Christian faith, in accordance with which the world of nature and of human existence finds its ultimate ground and goal in a transcendent, supernatural, and supra-social Being. But again, he fails to explain what he means by this positive assertion, and it is not clear how his own world view would be different from that of what might be called a Christian Experimentalist.

Dr. Smith's insistence that, in the inception of the modern movement of religious education in the earlier years of this century, there was a tendency to place chief emphasis upon technique and method is well-founded. He does not, however, sufficiently recognize how vital were the issues of that period and to what degree religious educators were involved in them. Indeed, one reason that so much attention was given to methodology was because the possibility of an educational process for the realization of Christian experience and for the development of Christian beliefs was a central issue of this period. Despite these considerations, Dr. Smith's criticism that religious educators have failed to give adequate attention to the theological assumptions and implications of their progressive educational processes is well-taken, and will serve to give impetus to a movement already under way for the more definite formulation of a theological framework for progressive religious education.

As the basis for his critique of modern religious education, Dr. Smith attempts to state, in the main chapters of his book, what he considers to be the "theological" implications of modern religious

education. It must be admitted that he has done a very disappointing piece of work in his attempt to state the positions of those whom he criticizes. Indeed, he repeatedly reveals a curious failure to grasp the meaning and implications of modern educational processes. Perhaps the explanation of this failure is to be found in the basic thesis of his book that "present-day nurture is essentially the child of the religious faith of the late nineteenth century." Coming to the authors with this assumption, he has failed to see the degree to which they represent a radical but, nevertheless, positive reconstruction of the educational process, and of the Christian faith as compared with liberal Protestantism of the last century. He repeatedly reads into the ideas of Coe and others what he considers to be the logic of their position, and uses quotations "homiletically" out of their context to confirm his interpretations. Consequently, the book fails in being a really searching critique of progressive religious education, because so much of it is given to a criticism of that which no progressive religious educator believes, or which progressive religious educators would criticize as drastically as Dr. Smith himself.

In the positive parts of the book, Dr. Smith seems to be caught in an unresolved conflict. Repeatedly, after making a sweeping criticism of liberal religion and religious education which would seem to imply an unreserved support of a new orthodoxy, he qualifies his criticism to a degree which results in his retaining much, if not all, of what is important in the position he has criticized; but he does not indicate how he can make these qualifications and still hold to his neo-orthodoxy. In short, he seems to be in the dilemma facing many educational leaders in regard to the relationship of their historic beliefs to the assumptions and implications of an educational process. He seems to be attempting to recapture his orthodox beliefs, and, at the same time, not to lose the gains of modern religious education, to which he was, at one time, so fully committed. As a result, he seems to have two sets of beliefs which have not been integrated in his own philosophy.

It is to be hoped that Dr. Smith will very soon publish another book, in which he will make clear what he believes the theological framework and the educational procedures of religious education should be. Doubtless, there must be important issues between Dr. Smith and his friends and colleagues in the field of religious education, or he would not have written this book, but what these issues are he

has not made clear. Indeed, one suspects that Dr. Smith is nearer to the liberal religious education which he criticizes than his sweeping and drastic criticisms would seem to indicate. In any case, in fairness to himself and to his friends and colleagues in religious education, it is incumbent upon him to clear the present confusion as to what he really believes and would advocate in religious education, and as to how his point of view is in fact different from the religious educators of whom he is critical.

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BOOK NOTES

East and West. By René Guénon. Translated by William Massey. London: Luzac & Co., 1941. 257 p. 6*s*.

Whoever reads this book, and every student of philosophy and religion should, must be prepared for some terrific jolts calculated to unsaddle him from his accustomed thinking. The Renaissance we glorify is branded a monstrous development, a regress; belief in the supremacy of life and the efficacy of reason treated as a superstition; the idea of progress stigmatized as a grand illusion; our conventional morality derided as sentimentality; the "unseasonable proselytism" to which we are prone draws the comment of being something "grossly vulgar"; our Western science and philosophy are called the suicide of intelligence. A case of psychalgia, a militant expression of *Weltschmerz* in a Frenchman? Perhaps. But labels such as these would be bad substitutes for thought. Actually, whoever touches the heartstrings of man's destiny, as does the author, cannot help but castigate stupidities of the age in the hope of effecting a palingenesis.

For it is incontestible that our concept, man, is hopelessly provincial, occidental. We do not even admit the possibility of correcting our notions of what man is, what he aspires to, what his presuppositions are for his intellectual, moral, and religious sensibilities, on the basis of mankind. We are so intoxicated with what we in the West possess and hope to possess that, if the remaining two thirds of mankind do think and feel and have anything at all, it is only for our burden.

The voices are not many that have spoken to us in French about these things. It is good to have this English translation which prepares the way for other translations of the earlier of Guénon's works in which all criticism launched on the score of occultism and the like are parried. We consider it unfortunate that the name of "traditionalism" has been chosen for what Guénon and those on his side stand for, because it is bound to lead to misunderstanding. Would he withdraw into the sheltered thinking of the Middle Ages? By no means. What then is tradition? It is nothing but the set of principles governing man and universe, the recognition of which obligates, and in the assent to which man attains his own. Loss or forgetfulness of this tradition has led, according to Guénon, to this deplorable and false split into Eastern and Western humanity. Complete disregard of certain truths is engendered by the mad rush to keep up with the *māyā* of progress. Man's aims and purposes in life have become completely externalized, and philosophy has even lowered itself by condoning useless subtleties and allowing intelligence to be made, with Bergson, "the faculty of constructing unorganized—that is to say artificial—instruments," and nothing more. Such being the status of intelligence, do we wonder at the state of the world? Under such conditions we would, indeed, concur with Guénon that ignorance is better than false knowledge, and that silence is

the best refuge of those who possess understanding. And the *real* East is still so patient and so quiet, even though its sons now assiduously copy the West. The present *tohu vabohu* seems, indeed, to bear out Guénon (now somewhere in Africa or Asia), in his claim that our salvation lies in restoration of pure intellectuality.

And what has he to say on religion and its contribution? He clearly distinguishes between religion that has preserved its traditional character (traditional in the sense given above) and what he chooses to call its "deformations or imitations" (cf. p. 146). The Oriental possesses less religion than we do, taking the word in the church sense. Guénon is not loath to deny it, but he credits him with more intelligence and less sentimental moralism. Had we, he avers, kept the religious sense of our ancestors, we would reserve the name of religion for that for which it was intended.

In the scheme of things there is a higher and a lower, and intellectual shortsightedness coupled with the "classical prejudice" or the belief in a single, absolute civilization, is our undoing. It is not flight into mysticism which Guénon proposes, but the bringing back of a *normal* civilization, with its biologically conditioned variations. He calls not for social and economic iconoclasm; he merely appeals to those who have graduated into the class of the "intellectual elect," which graduation requires neither the knowledge of secrets nor initiation, nor great scholarship. They will do what is needful in this re-orientation in the literal sense; for knowledge obliges.

KURT F. LEIDECKER

Preparation for Citizenship. By SOPHIA WADIA. Bombay: International Book House, 1941. xii + 72 pp. R. 1.

The interesting feature of this little book is the author's use of texts of Hinduism to dress modern, Western ideas. Since it is addressed to students, it shows how they are being introduced to the modern principle of citizenship. The method is stimulating, and shows that Hindu civilization is still vital in a world in which East and West are in intimate contact. The title of the three lectures which make up the book are, "Democracy a Spiritual Principle," "The Duty of the Citizen to the State," and "The Duty of the State to the Citizen." The interpretation is in world terms. "There is much talk of a Federated India: political and economic factors are being considered, but there are moral and philosophic aspects which are mostly neglected. But national politics no more than international politics must tempt us away from our study. The Federated India must be One Family—united, harmonious, whole, part of the great World Family." The real basis and foundation for democracy "is to be found in the *Upanishads* and the *Gita*. Democracy in the final analysis is the rule of the people." The word "is not so good and philosophical a term as the Sanskrit—*Svarāj*, Rule of the Self." The implications of the spiritual principle are:

The Brāhmana, for example, is not superior to the Çūdra, but only different; and both contribute something to the common good. Each human being through his capacity and his character is different from other human beings, but each is fulfilling his own particular mission, and all are of equal value and importance. . . . Thus spiritual democracy aims not at destroying the differences, but at using them as of equal value to the individual as well as to humanity as a whole. . . . The citizen of a spiritual democracy should be endowed with an education which will enable him to use his own life-profession, whatever it may be, as the fulfillment of his citizenship.

It is difficult to find a new note here, even with the word caste left out. Education, the lecturer says, must lead us to serve "the State through our profession, our very means of livelihood." The first aim for adults must be, not literacy, but self-discipline. The author uses here the idea expressed in the Buddha's "right livelihood," whatever that livelihood may be. The principle of *saṁsāra* (transmigration of souls) is brought in to show how the wealth of experience which each may bring to the service of democracy, is enhanced; and the law of *karma* is interpreted, not as fatalism, but as "Perpetual Motion in the moral and in the intellectual worlds and that Motion envelops all things, all governments, and please note, all officials of governments!" The state has obligations towards its citizens, and the "Native states" are not here released from duty.

GEORGE W. BRIGGS

What Mean These Stones? The Significance of Archeology for Biblical Studies. By MILLAR BURROWS. New Haven: American Schools of Oriental Research, 1941. xvi + 306 pp. $2.50.

This war has become global. While the actual fighting has as yet not reached the confines of Palestine, excavations there, especially those conducted by American and English societies, have practically ceased for the duration. A glorious epoch of fruitful and far-reaching explorations in the Near East which lasted for more than two decades, the interim of the two World Wars, has come to a close. From a narrow scientific view, this calamity is not void of its blessing. The field workers are back home busily engaged with the pen. The breathing-spell afforded by the war is utilized to interpret, evaluate, and explain the great discoveries made in the field.

Professor Burrows, formerly director of the American School of Oriental Research in Jerusalem, has done a great service to students working in the fields of the Old and the New Testaments in publishing this authoritative and outstanding book. The volume, as the author himself states in the preface "has been written with a frankly and definitely religious interest . . . and from a particular religious point of view, that of a liberal Protestant Christian." This, needless to say, does in no way mar or impair the value of the book, it rather adds a personal flavor which enlivens the pages dealing with "dead stones."

The book is divided into six chapters: (1) introduction, (2) text and languages, (3) general orientation, (4) material and secular background,

(5) religious and ethical background, and (6) explanation, illustration, and evaluation. The two maps, the fifty-eight illustrations, and the three indexes enhance greatly the usefulness of the volume. Primarily, the book deals with discoveries made in Palestine, but the author also includes those made in the neighboring countries, especially Ugarit and Nuzi. The book, however, is more than a mere presentation of facts. Professor Burrows poses the all-important question of the relation between archeological discoveries and biblical tradition: does the former uphold the latter? He wisely answers the query by pointing out the limitations of archeology. A number of things in the Bible which were formerly misunderstood or not understood at all, have been clarified. The horizon of the pre-biblical, biblical, and post-biblical world has been considerably widened, and what was formerly seen in parts can now be seen as a whole. But archeology has its limits. Stones may be made to talk, but they cannot resuscitate life as lived three thousand years ago.

The author is to be congratulated on this excellent book, which is of great value both to the students of the Bible and of the Ancient Near East.

I. MENDELSOHN

And Great Shall Be Your Reward: The Origins of Christian Views of Salvation. By PAUL S. MINEAR. (*Yale Studies in Religion,* No. 12) New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941. vii + 74 pp. $1.00.

This Ph.D. Dissertation, by the professor of New Testament at Garrett Biblical Institute, is a real contribution to the understanding of Christian doctrine concerning this puzzling matter of reward. According to the author, Jesus himself adhered to the traditional Jewish belief in concrete rewards in a coming age, believing, as he did, in the imminence of the Kingdom of God on earth; whereas St. Paul, following more the Hellenistic idea of salvation as an inner, spiritual happiness independent of outward conditions, succeeded in making a synthesis of the two conceptions, which served satisfactorily to adjust the Christian mind to an indefinitely postponed coming of the Kingdom. Unfortunately the Church, in her later history, has not held to this synthesis, but has fluctuated between extremes in both directions. The last section of the book includes discussions of the theories of John Macmurray, C. H. Dodd, Paul Tillich, and Reinhold Niebuhr.

M. B.

The Feast of the Presentation of the Virgin Mary in the Temple: An Historical and Literary Study. By SISTER MARY JEROME KISHPAUGH. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1941. xii + 159 pp.

This doctoral dissertation from the Catholic University of America traces the origin of the tradition of the Virgin's Presentation in the Temple, and recounts the gradual development of the feast in the Greek and Latin Churches up to the sixteenth century.

It is in the apocryphal gospels, of which the oldest is the *Protoevangelium of James* (late fourth century), that we first meet the story of Mary's Presentation. After recounting the miraculous conception and birth of the Virgin, the *Protoevangelium* tells of her father, Joachim, bringing her to the priests while she was yet a child. Until her espousals she remained at the Temple.

The story is referred to and sometimes elaborated in later gospels, as for instance the *Gospel of Pseudo-Matthew*, which was the principal source through which such legends were known in the Middle Ages. There are a number of patristic references to the Presentation, but only those of Epiphanius go back to the fourth century.

The origin of the cult used to be placed in A.D. 730, but since the researches of Bouvy and Vailhé it has now been shown to go back to the sixth century. Special importance attaches to the erection by Justinian of the Basilica of Saint Mary in Jerusalem, close to the ruins of the Temple. This Church was dedicated in 543, and its erection may well have some connection with the cult. Sister Mary Jerome adds some interesting notes on the Eastern cult (November 21st), illustrating its beauty from the Offices for Little and Great Festivals (pp. 55 ff.).

The most important part of her thesis deals with the evidences for the Western cult. Here she has shown that, both in England and on the Continent, there was some knowledge of the story of the Presentation before the fourteenth century. This is attested by medieval iconography as well as literature. For the cult we have the evidence of several thirteenth century French breviaries, which show traces of its observance before the time of Philippe de Mézières (pp. 71 ff.). In England, the feast was celebrated in some monasteries even before the Norman Conquest, and the author has made an interesting reconstruction of the *Oblatio* Office from the thirteenth century *Sanctorale* of Hyde Abbey (pp. 83 ff). Yet the cult could not have been in any sense widespread until the fourteenth century.

There can be no question that it was due to the efforts of Philippe de Mézières that the feast gained an established place in the West. The author devotes her fourth chapter to an able and clear account of Philippe and his *Officium Presentationis B.V.M.* It was on November 21st, 1372 that, with the permission of Gregory IX, Philippe's *Officium* was first celebrated, in the church of the Friars Minor in Avignon. The author concludes her thesis with an interesting study of the Presentation in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. She has made a painstaking survey of traces of it in the vernacular literature of England, and she has appended some notes on the festival in connection with Continental liturgical books and papal legislation.

The author writes with care and clarity and has documented her thesis with great pains. While her topic is strictly limited, her work is a most useful contribution to the study of liturgical history.

C. C. R.

Sachsenspiegel and Bible. By GUIDO KISCH. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Indiana Press, 1941. ix + 198 pp.

This inquiry into the relation of the Sachsenspiegel, the oldest and most outstanding of medieval German law books, to the Bible is not without general interest. Not only has this particular aspect of the study of early German law been neglected, but the Sachsenspiegel has not been widely studied outside German circles. Indeed, there is as yet no English translation of the work—a labor which may well be suggested to doctoral candidates looking for a useful task. The groundwork of modern research on the Sachsenspiegel has been done by Karl Zeumer, Karl Eckhardt, and other scholars, though the great edition planned for the *Monumenta Germanica* has been delayed by the tragic fate of modern Germany.

Dr. Kisch opens his study with a lucid account of the Sachsenspiegel and of its thirteenth century author, Eike von Repgow, of Anhalt. This is followed by a survey of its sources and a statement of the problem in relation to the Bible. The main part of the work is devoted to a minute and careful presentation of evidence to show the direct influence of the Scriptures on the Sachsenspiegel, and Eike von Repgow's profound knowledge of the Bible. The book concludes with a more general discussion of the biblical spirit in relation to the Sachsenspiegel. A careful bibliography and indices are appended, while throughout the text there are a number of interesting medieval illustrations from manuscripts of the Sachsenspiegel.

Dr. Kirsch's volume is a welcome contribution if for no other reason than that the study of the influence of the Bible on Western Law is almost a virgin field. The significance of the Scriptures for the philosophy and art of the Middle Ages has been treated abundantly, but no careful investigation has been made of their relation to law. Dr. Kisch has well substantiated his claim of the direct influence of the Bible upon the Sachsenspiegel, and has reversed the prevailing opinion which denies to Eike any deep knowledge of the Scriptures.

C. C. R.

The Inner World. By JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941. xxvii + 292 pp. $3.50.

John Wright Buckham has many friendly and admiring readers, and all of them will welcome this definitive summary of his philosophical position. For years he has been one of the pillars of that school of thought which stands for personalism, a critical intuitionism, mysticism, and a literal and enlightened Christian philosophy. The central and common character of all these varied strands of thought consists in emphasis upon and defense of "the inner world"; hence the significance of the present work and of its title. The author's purpose in writing it has been "to go below the surface of our disturbed and disheartened time in search of reassuring underlying

realities and values in human life and experience." With this purpose in view the task of the present work is, more specifically, "the endeavor to gain as comprehensive a view as possible of the Inner World, to obtain, as far as may be, a *conspectus* of it as a whole, rather than to explore one part or another with thoroughness."

It is evident that in such an undertaking, the fundamental and crucial problems to be investigated will center round the self and the self's experience. These are controversial matters, and probably many of Dr. Buckham's readers will disagree with his conclusions. His general position is that of the Personalist School. "The self transcends both experience and thought. Not, thought prehends the thinker, but the thinker, thought. First the *self*, the experiencing subject; then thought. . . . An experience without an experiencer is meaningless. . . . A self is a unitary self-active being who has self-consciousness, self-identity, reason, emotion, freedom, and worth." Individuality means this and more; it means having also "a unique contour of selfhood. To be an individual is to be a single, sole and unrepeatable human being." The individualized self needs the community before it can attain to what our author terms personality. "From Self to Person, from Person to Community, from the Beloved Community to the Great Community, the Kingdom of God—such are the successive steps in the progress of Humanity toward its Goal, as they unfold before the vision of the Christian mind."

The self is the subject and the presupposition of experience. But by experience is to be understood neither the content of consciousness, nor the "subconscious" nor knowledge, nor mere givenness; but the responsive awareness of the self, an awareness which is at once cognitive, emotional, and volitional, both receptive and active. It is of several sorts, the highest forms of which are "self-and-other experience" and "spiritual experience." "Spiritual experience consists of the higher and wider experience that embraces the realm of persons as a whole (humanity) together with its values and relation as it reaches upward to fulfilment in religious experience." It goes without saying that Dr. Buckham's conceptions of the self and of experience will be attacked by many philosophers and psychologists.

With experience and the self to base it on, our author goes ahead to build up a philosophy of religion which deals interestingly with such matters as religion, theism, history, revelation, and in two chapters toward the close with the problem of immortality. In some ways these two are the most original and suggestive chapters of the book.

J. B. P.

Contemporary Religious Thought: An Anthology. Compiled by THOMAS KEPLER. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1941. 423 pp. $3.50.

All of the articles in this volume are reprinted from books or magazines and are familiar to anyone who reads widely in contemporary religious literature. In evaluating these sixty brief selections from fifty-two writers,

there are three norms to be kept in mind: (1) Has the compiler chosen the right writers for his purpose? (2) Are the selections representative of the writers themselves? (3) What is the value of the book taken as a whole?

(1) Some writings in the last twenty years have become "so classic" that they have assumed "a pinnacle place." Others have been chosen because "they present views in a colorful or poignant manner." Thus we find Will Durant, Brown Landone, Walter Lippmann, Charles F. Potter, and Arthur H. Compton. But we look in vain for John C. Bennett, Douglas Clyde Macintosh, William Temple, Gerald Birney Smith, John Baillie, Shailer Mathews, and Walter Horton. These are significant omissions, although every influential writer obviously could not be included. But on the while, the choice of writers is excellent.

(2) Henry Nelson Wieman appears four times, and the selections are good. One is especially thankful for his "Some Blind Spots Removed" (from *The Christian Century*) in permanent form. Edwin E. Aubrey's chapter on "Neo-Thomism" is one of the best summaries of that subject, but it is unfortunate that the footnotes were removed. William James is not at his best on immortality, while the last chapter of his *Varieties of Religious Experience* is a classic. The choice from Richard Niebuhr is representative, but Reinhold Niebuhr's later writings on Christian ethics are more characteristic of his thought than the selection in this volume, which was written in 1931. The late Canon Streeter wrote better articles than the one on spiritualism. Most of the chapters, however, are as typical as can be expected when the purpose of the anthology is kept in mind.

(3) The book is heavily weighted on the side of modernism, humanism, and individual idiosyncrasies, which means that it is not a cross-section of contemporary theology in America. It has eleven articles by avowed humanists, six on mysticism, and over twenty are by liberals. Twelve could be called conservative, and one is pantheistic. For one promoting modernism, the book has definite value, for it includes many of the best modernist writers, with enough of the others for healthy contrast.

The chapters are classified under six major headings: The Nature of Religion, The Finding of Religious Truth, The Idea of God, The Problem of Evil, The Meaning of Worship, and Immortality. The total effect is satisfactory, except possibly for the subject of Immortality.

Perhaps the reviewer, who also teaches philosophy of religion, is indulging in his own evaluations as against those of the compiler. The total effect of the book is such that it may be used as a convenient reference book for any teacher who wishes to send his students to brief primary sources, and it will prove handy for anyone who desires to bring himself up to date in the field. It provides a miniature library in which there are some real classics of religious writing. Every passage is eminently readable, and the intelligent layman or clergyman will find it rewarding. The bibliography and biographical index are of value.

RANDOLPH CRUMP MILLER

Poetry as a Means of Grace. By CHARLES GROSVENER OSGOOD. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1941. 131 pp. $2.00.

During the year 1940, Charles Grosvener Osgood, Professor Emeritus at Princeton, delivered a series of lectures on four poets at the Princeton Theological Seminary. These popular addresses now appear in book form, couched in fluent and easy style by one of our most seasoned veterans in literary scholarship. Containing only the most familiar information and ideas, they still have a genuine interest, owing to their author's pedagogical instinct, long-trained literary taste and humane spirit. This value is an aroma given off by the book, rather than any merits which it possesses as literary or philosophical discussion. Professor Osgood belongs to a school now rapidly passing from the scene, whose retirement is in so many ways regrettable. He shows absolutely no concern for systematic analysis; instead, he betrays a relish for literature at its best and an unaffected warmth and enthusiasm.

The presentation is partly governed by the circumstances under which the addresses were given. A vein of piety and moralizing seldom found in comment today runs through most of the pages. The four essays are not critiques but homilies. The approach may also be determined in part by the author's long experience in teaching young students. He discusses four authors: Dante, Spenser, Milton, and Samuel Johnson. Since Professor Osgood is best known as a student of Spenser, one might expect that the appreciation of that poet would prove the most discerning section. Such is not the case. Called in the nineteenth century the poet's poet, Spenser has, in the twentieth century, become conspicuously out of fashion among poets, and has become, instead, the scholar's poet. It is a pity that, of the many essays which have appeared during the last score of years in appreciation of this great humanist, none has proved entirely worthy of its promising but difficult theme. The studies of Dante and Milton are introductions to their subjects, written in an agreeable but a deliberately elementary manner. Professor Osgood hardly appears at his best in discussing poetry. It would seem that, like Doctor Johnson himself, "he loved most the biographical part of literature." Hence the brief appreciation of Johnson, while it avoids the vexed problem of drawing the line between the Doctor's genius and his banality, is the most appealing part of the book. The very real worth of the lectures as a whole lies in their geniality and in the warmth of appreciation which they exhibit. They may help the pedantic to grow younger and the quite young in literary training to grow older. But they will hardly be of major importance to the more thoughtful student.

HENRY W. WELLS

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